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This thesis examines the Narcissus theme and narcissism in the literature of the 
nineteenth century, focusing on the theme as it is reflected in Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein and Nietzsche’s Zur Genealogie der Moral, especially the dramatic shift in 
perspective towards narcissism reflected in these two works.   Historical and cultural 
changes over the course of the nineteenth century that may have led to this reversal are 
discussed, and it is suggested that the earlier negative view  of  narcissism is bound with a 
theological concept of the “self” that is no longer compatible with the understanding of 
humanity’s radically animal nature.  A positive view of narcissism in Nietzsche's writing 
may reflect a vacuum in the traditional understanding of the “self” that demands “self-
creation.”  Narcissistic expression may also represent a liberation from the superstitious 
awe surrounding the former, more theological concept of the “self” and from the moral 
constraints of the theology from which this derived.  Analysis of the Narcissus theme, 
beginning with Ovid's version of the tale in the Metamorphoses then moving into the 
nineteenth-century works, reveals common strands in all the depictions of narcissism 
discussed.  The analysis concludes that while Nietzsche assumes a positive stance 
towards a narcissistic pose, the self-idealization reflected in his work is as illusory as the 
negatively reflected narcissism of the earlier versions, and that below the surface of 
Nietzsche's jubilant tone the philosophical voice of his work seems as haunted by the 












II. OVID’S STORY OF NARCISSUS……………………………………..……...14 
 
III. MARY SHELLEY’S FRANKENSTEIN……………………………………..…27 
 


















This thesis examines the Narcissus theme and narcissism in the literature of the 
nineteenth century, focusing in particular on Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein and 
Nietzsche’s Zur Genealogie der Moral.  The study specifically examines the dramatic 
shift in perspective towards narcissism reflected in these two works.  Prior to the 
nineteenth century and through the first part of it, literary works have usually taken a dim 
view of the tendency towards narcissism.  Shelley’s novel presents a dramatic example of 
this, portraying narcissistic self-idealization as cruel, self-destructive and potentially 
catastrophic, while Nietzsche represents a reversal of this orientation, assuming and even 
embracing a narcissistic posture in his philosophy.  In Zur Genealogie der Moral he 
presents it as an attribute of  the figure who shall “restore to the earth its aim.” (GM 230).  
Historical and cultural changes before and during the nineteenth century may have led to 
this reversal.   During the previous two centuries science and reason had been changing 
humanity's view of the world and of itself, drawing attention away from God as the 
source of truth, and the secularizing effect of this was profoundly felt by the nineteenth 
century.  This shift of human focus away from God was dramatically intensified in the 
middle of the nineteenth century, through the work of Charles Darwin, whose discovery 
of the laws of natural selection seemed to sound the final death knell to any traditionally 
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religious notions of the significance of human existence.  It may be that the earlier 
negative view  of  narcissism was bound to a theological concept of the “self” that was no 
longer compatible with the understanding of humanity’s radically animal nature.  Perhaps 
this understanding both created a vacuum in the understanding of the “self” that 
demanded “self-creation,” and drove away the shadows of superstitious awe surrounding 
the former concept of the “self” and the relationship of this to God, thus allowing the 
freedom to “self-create,” and to celebrate that self-creation.  In this way Nietzsche's 
superior individual steps into the place left by God, as did Victor Frankenstein in 
Shelley's novel—a theme that links the two works.  But whereas an ominous air of 
foreboding and looming destruction hovers around this usurpation in Frankenstein, 
Nietzsche's work seems to hail self-creation and self-celebration with newfound freedom.  
This study will examine these themes of narcissism and stepping into the role of God, and 
the interconnection of these themes in Shelley’s novel and Nietzsche’s philosophical 
work.  Some preliminary discussion of the Narcissus theme and especially its place in the 
nineteenth century is necessary to this study, as is a grounding in the theme through an 
analysis of Ovid’s version of the Narcissus tale:  the version that has given the story its 
most influential expression.    
The ancient story of Narcissus, the beautiful, scornful boy who broke hearts until 
he finally broke his own, has cast a long shadow over Western culture and literature since 
Ovid gave the story its most lasting form in his Metamorphoses.  Recurrence of the story 
and allusion to it in literature of various periods and traditions, its resonance in modern 
psychoanalysis as well as popular language and culture—all of this suggests that the story 
touches upon something deep in human experience.  The different associations with 
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Narcissus and narcissism vary widely; what unites them is the connotation of self-
enamorment, of which the tale of Narcissus serves as a sort of prototype.  Although in 
recent times the whole notion of a “self” has fallen into question or been denied 
altogether, the experience of the “self” and the particular response to that experience 
portrayed in Ovid’s tale seem to have been a major source of the story’s timeless 
fascination.  It is interesting to note that although the word “narcissism” has been applied 
differently throughout its history, what is now commonly meant by it is not radically 
different from the self-infatuation Ovid’s narration captured.  Nevertheless, a superficial 
and simplistically moralizing view of this self-infatuation does not do justice to its 
existential and moral dimensions in the story.  It is hoped that this study will cast a 
penetrating ray into those depths, in its examination of the theme as it is presented in 
Ovid’s tale and its variations in later works, especially the reversal of perspective on the 
theme represented by the two nineteenth-century writers, who over the course of that 
century present a reversal of perspective on an ancient theme. 
 For the purposes of this thesis, “narcissism” does not carry the psychoanalytic 
implications attached to it by Freud.  The theme of narcissism as it is explored here in 
fact does not borrow from any technical or otherwise established definition of the term, 
but is a study of what literary texts capture about self-enamorment in their depictions of 
human behavior and their insights into the human soul, how such self-enamorment molds 
one's view of the world and what consequences follow from a world view so molded.  
Immediately apparent is the fact that this definition incorporates at least one assumption 
that is highly disputed in contemporary literary spheres and which therefore ought to be 
addressed:  that there is a “human soul” to peer into.  Depending on how “soul” is defined 
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there is nothing necessarily theological about this assumption.  Friedrich Nietzsche, one 
of the primary authors to be discussed in this study, was among the first to vehemently 
and categorically refute the existence of the human “soul” or “subject” with his famous 
declaration , “es giebt kein 'Sein' hinter dem Thun, Wirken, Werden; der Thäther ist zum 
Thun bloss hinzugedichtet—das Thun ist Alles.”  (“But no such agent exists; there is no 
'being' behind the doing, acting, becoming; the 'doer' has simply been added to the deed 
[doing] by the imagination—the deed is everything.”)1  Nevertheless he himself speaks 
routinely throughout Zur Genealogie der Moral about “Werthungsweisen” (ways of 
evaluating), by which he essentially means a world view; and this assumes some locus in 
the individual where such a world view has its place.  For present purposes nothing more 
must necessarily be added to the definition of “soul” here.  A sense of “self”—a sense of 
who one is and how one fits into one's world—is part of that world view, and a 
particularly important one for the purposes of this study, since narcissism is a particular 
kind of  relationship with the “self.”  It is acknowledged that the notion of a “self” is 
highly disputed in current intellectual and especially literary discourse.   But this dispute 
seems to be primarily over the ultimate source, autonomy or possibly the ultimate 
meaning of the “self.”  Comparatively few thinkers doubt that there are such things as 
thoughts, desires, motivations, values, interests, capabilities or any of the other numerous 
aspects that are thought to constitute one's personhood; at least, all of these terms are 
regularly used without embarrassment.  The “self” seems a useful designation for the 
totality of these elements in the individual, the various social, physical, linguistic and 
                                                 
1
 Friedrich Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral:  Eine Streitschrift (Stuttgart:  
Phillip Reclam jun., 2003) 35 (hereafter cited as ZGM to distinguish it from the English 
translation).   
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other forces that determine (or even construct) certain aspects of the “self” 
notwithstanding.2  Possibly more problematic is that in this study, the “real self” is 
distinguished from the “idealized self,” which is considered to be illusory.  If, as is 
usually not doubted, it is possible to perceive one's own thoughts, desires, motivations, 
values, as well as the other aspects that one considers to constitute “oneself,”  then it 
should follow that it is possible to perceive these more accurately or less accurately.  
Dispute of this assertion constitutes a dispute over the existence of these aspects 
themselves or of one's ability to perceive them, and is no longer a dispute of the existence 
of a “self” per se.  Since ultimately it is possible to dispute the existence of anything, we 
must either take the existence of some things for granted, or suspend belief in them to 
some extent if we want to talk about them at all.    
 Since self-idealization is central to this study of narcissism, this requires 
definition as well.  For purposes of this analysis, self-idealization is the tendency not to 
see “oneself” (as the “self” has been defined) as one is, but an improvement, even a best 
thinkable (or unthinkable) version of this according to whatever values from which one is 
operating, even if this bears no obvious similarity to the “real self.”  The latter is the 
“self” (again as this has been defined) accurately perceived, as far as this is possible.  It 
does not need to be assumed here that the “real self” is ever seen in any absolute or 
unmediated way—or even that it would resemble some coherent unity if it could be—
                                                 
2
 The unconscious is often presented as an entity that particular problematizes the 
notion of a “self” since it is (by definition) a dimension of oneself of which one is 
unaware.  But this does not constitute an objection to the idea of a “self” as it is presented 
here.  The totality of those elements that make up the self can as easily incorporate 
aspects of which one is unaware, as any other conceivable totality can contain unknown 
or unperceived aspects, in spite of the fact that any such totality is as mediated by 
perception and conceptualization as the “self.” 
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only that the various elements of what one considers to be “oneself” may be more 
accurately perceived in some cases than in others, and that the abandonment of that effort 
in favor of some much more favorable self-image is what constitutes self-idealization.3  
Enamorment with that idealized self-image is narcissism.  This definition is borrowed in 
part from Spaas, who himself claims to borrow from Ovid, in defining self-idealization as 
enamorment with an image of a “self that tends to become idealized.”4 Based on the 
analyses of the works examined in this paper, an externalization or projection of that 
idealized image, in some way, upon the outside world might seem also to belong to this 
definition; whether that must necessarily be the case is difficult to say, and is perhaps 
beyond the scope of this study to determine.   
  From Ovid’s time until long into the modern age, a certain consistency can be 
observed in attitudes towards narcissism in Western literature across vastly different 
cultural landscapes.  As has already been mentioned, a designation of a certain 
disposition and relationship towards the “self”—and especially the characterization of the 
personality exemplifying these—“narcissism” has usually been regarded negatively.  It is 
not surprising that this would be true of the Christian tradition, in which an individual’s 
tendency towards self-infatuation can be regarded as a threat to a proper relation to God 
                                                 
3
 The word “idealization,” without respect to the “self” is perhaps a more difficult 
word to define, especially given its complex history within philosophy, literature and 
culture in general.  Since “idealization” is only used in this study in relation to “self-
idealization,” a working definition with respect to this can also be offered.  “Idealization” 
in this study refers to the projection of the ideal self upon the outside world:  the sense 
that the outside world reflects or should reflect the values, importance or even image of 
the idealized self.  An example might be a sense that  destiny is shaping or should shape 
the world according to the values (and/or the benefit) of the “idealized self.” 
 
4
 Lieve Spaas, introduction, Echoes of Narcissus, by various authors (New York:  
Oxford, 2000) 2. 
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and to others—the sense  that Milton gives the theme in his allusion to the myth in 
Paradise Lost.  It is somewhat more surprising that it would be true of Ovid himself, who 
in spite of his characteristically humorous style and ironic distance instills the story with 
a profound moral poignancy.   
During the course of the nineteenth century, as has been mentioned, a different 
stance towards narcissism emerges, which seems in part to be due to profound cultural 
changes.  Over the course of the previous two centuries science and reason had been 
changing humanity's view of the world and of itself.   Discoveries of the laws of nature 
and especially the supplanting of the Ptolemaic cosmology drew attention away from 
God and towards science as a means of obtaining truth, and the Enlightenment had 
deposed faith and enthroned reason.  The secularizing effect of these developments is 
profoundly felt by the nineteenth century.  Writing in 1799, Novalis voices a lament not 
uncommon among those who saw reason to deplore the increasing secularization of 
European society: “Es waren schöne glänzende Zeiten, wo Europa ein christliches Land 
war…” (“Those were beautiful, splendid times when Europe was a Christian land”), 
following this pronouncement with expressions of regret over the displacement of faith 
particularly by a scientific mindset that reduced the world to the status of  “ein 
unbedeutender Wandelstern” (“an insignificant planet”) and the cosmic order to that of  
“tote Gesetzwirkung” (“dead effect of [natural] law”).5  Mary Shelley is clearly 
thematizing this enthronement of science in her novel Frankenstein, which seems to 
contain a warning toward an age of scientific arrogance ushered in by this development.  
                                                 
5
 Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg), “Die Christenheit oder Europa,” in 
Fragmente und Studien und Die Christenheit oder Europa, ed. Carl Paschek (Stuttgart:  




In that novel, science is spoken of with the same fervency once reserved for the holy, 
which it seems to have replaced; but throughout literature of the early nineteenth century 
other pursuits and entities, such as romantic love, art or nature, have absorbed some of 
this free-floating quality of the divine as well.  In Friedrich Schlegel's novel Lucinde, the 
character Julius, the narrative voice through most of the novel, says, “Wir sind dankbar 
und zufrieden mit dem was die Götter wollen und was sie in der heiligen Schrift der 
schönen Natur so klar angedeutet haben.” (“We are grateful and content with what the 
gods want, and what they have so clearly intimated in the holy scripture of beautiful 
nature.”)6  And throughout the novel, as is typical in much European literature of the 
romantic era, romantic love is treated religiously and imbued throughout with the quality 
of the divine:  “Aber die volle Harmonie fand er allein in Lucindens Seele, wo die Keime 
alles Herrlichen und alles Heiligen nur auf den Strahl seines Geistes warteten, um sich 
zur schönsten Religion zu entfalten.“ (“But the full harmony he found only in the soul of 
Lucinde, where the seeds of everything glorious and holy only waited upon the ray of his 
spirit, to unfold itself to the most beautiful religion”) (85).  It is perhaps no coincidence 
that the Narcissus theme begins making a prominent appearance in literature of this era, 
and in fact figures importantly in both of these novels.  Its appearance in Frankenstein 
will be a major subject of focus in this study.  In Lucinde it figures explicitly as a contrast 
to the fulfillment of mutual love for another:   
Wenn ein Gemüth voll unbewußter Liebe da, wo es Gegenliebe hoffte, 
sich selbst findet, wird es von Erstaunen getroffen.  Doch bald läßt sich 
der Mensch wieder durch den Zauber der Anschauung locken und 
                                                 
6
 Friedrich Schlegel, Lucinde, ed. Karl Konrad Polheim (Stuttgart:  Philip Reclam 




täuschen, seinen Schatten zu lieben....Der Geist verliert sich in seiner 
klaren Tiefe und findet sich wie Narcissus als Blume wieder. 
 
When a soul filled with unconscious love finds itself, where it had hoped 
for mutual love, it is struck by amazement.  Yet soon the person is enticed 
and deceived by the magic of the sight into loving his own shadow.  The 
spirit loses itself in its clear depths and, like Narcissus, finds itself again as 
a flower.(87) 
 
 The theme appears less explicitly as well within the relationship seemingly typifying the 
sublime heights such mutual love is capable of reaching, as Lucinde says to Julius:  
“Nicht ich, mein Julius, bin die die Du so heilig mahlst,...Du bists, es ist die 
Wunderblume Deiner Fantasie, die Du in mir, die ewig Dein ist, dann erblickst...” (“not  
I, my Julius, am she whom you paint with such holiness,...It is you, it is the wondrous 
flower of your imagination, which you see in me, who am eternally yours”) (114). 
Although Julius' and Lucinde's love is depicted as joyous, devoted and true, in light of the 
earlier reference to Narcissus a certain irony is unmistakable here—irony which Julius 
does not seem at all to perceive, for he understands her words as modesty and flattery 
(thus confirming the  truth concealed in Lucinde's ironic observation):  “Laß die 
Bescheidenheit und schmeichele nicht,” “Leave off your modesty and do not flatter” 
(114).     
 Might there be a connection between this extension of the sense of the holy to 
secular things, and Narcissus?  It may be that the appearance of the theme of Narcissus 
signals the need, born of the displacement of God from the center of human focus and 
meaning, to step into that role and recreate the “self” as well, whose significance had 
been understood so intimately with reference to the Divine.  However this may be, the 
basic stand toward narcissism is still fundamentally the same as Ovid's at this point.  In 
spite of the optimistic portrayal of love in Lucinde, narcissism is viewed as a barrier to 
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real love; and even in the case of true love, narcissism keeps the lover from seeing the 
beloved herself:  he is really seeing himself and his own ideal in her.  As we shall see, the 
critique of narcissism in Shelley's novel is similar, though more encompassing and 
profound.  
It has been mentioned that the shift of human focus away from God taking place 
gradually over the course of a few centuries was dramatically intensified in the middle of 
nineteenth century through the work of Charles Darwin.  For many the discovery of the 
law of natural selection and the explanations it offered for the origins of all life, including 
humanity, seemed to announce the end of an era in which some higher divine purpose 
could any longer be ascribed to human existence.  And this in turn may explain, at least 
in part, the fundamentally different, even opposite orientation towards narcissism 
appearing in the philosophical works of Friedrich Nietzsche.  The profound influence of 
Darwin7 is clearly felt in Nietzsche's philosophy, in particular in Zur Genealogie der 
Moral.  Nietzsche's figure of the noble “Raubthier”8 celebrates the new status of the 
predator; for if nature itself is “red in tooth and claw,” then the predator has long been an 
unjustly maligned figure.  Nietzsche seems to transfer this same logic to the predatorial 
sort of human being, who, according to Nietzsche, not only has been unfairly vilified by a 
false and hypocritical moral system, but deserves to be on top of the reigning system of 
values, rather than banished by it.  Again it seems to be no coincidence, when narcissism 
                                                 
7
 Darwin published On the Origin of  Species in 1859, twenty-eight years before 
Nietzsche published Zur Genealogie der Moral, and Darwin is mentioned, though 
passingly, in the work. 
8
 “Raubthier” or “predatory animal,” a word used frequently in Zur Genealogie 
der Moral  to designate a heroic figure of exuberant health and strength and the casting 
off of false morality, is never actually paired with any German equivalent for “noble” 
(“vornehm”).  Nevertheless the appellation is fitting because the figure is an embodiment 
of the “vornehme Werthungsweise,” the system of values held by the superior ones.   
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appears in Nietzsche's self-characterization of the noble “Raubthier,” that a different 
orientation towards narcissism—a personality type maligned by tradition in the same way 
the predator has been maligned by culture—is assumed.  Narcissism seems to be the 
fitting posture of the heroic predator Nietzsche depicts; and this depiction bears striking 
similarities to the narcissistically oriented figure of Victor Frankenstein portrayed in 
Shelley's novel.  Both are analogous to what Ovid captured of narcissism in a more 
prototypical way two millenia earlier.  But the shift in perspective that deems it the 
appropriate stance and expression of the superior being is as seismic in its way as the 
reversal of hierarchies Nietzsche calls for.  This rather seismic shift in perspective 
towards an ancient theme is the focus of this study. 
Why Nietzsche's philosophy should be the subject of this study should be 
sufficiently clear at this point.  The choice of Shelley's novel as a counterpoint to 
Nietzsche still requires some justification.  Although, as has been mentioned, several 
works from around the same era could have been chosen for their incorporation of the 
Narcissus theme, Shelley's novel is particularly appropriate for several reasons.  First, the 
structure of the novel is eminently suitable for the development of the Narcissus theme.  
The multilayered narrative structure, consisting of narratives within narratives, builds into 
the novel a quality of reflection not unlike that thematized in Ovid's tale.  The same is 
true of the structure of the story and the characters.  Frankenstein's creature is an ideal 
narrative figure for reflecting Frankenstein himself, and the act of creation builds into the 
plot a division analogous to that which separates Narcissus from his reflection.  The 
allusion to the Narcissus story in the novel is actually an allusion to an allusion; it draws 
from John Milton's use of the story in Paradise Lost, to which Shelley makes 
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unmistakable references but also subverts and molds to her own purposes.  In this way 
she incorporates Milton's perspective on this theme, but is able to do something new with 
it as well; for in spite of this perspective, Frankenstein is very much a novel of its age.  In 
its treatment of the Narcissus theme, the novel in a way foreshadows changes later 
evident in Nietzsche; and it directly thematizes the development of a scientific world 
view that is in part bringing those changes about.  Perhaps more explicitly than any two 
authors of the nineteenth century Shelley and Nietzsche are both dealing with the 
problem of stepping into the role of God, of which they seem to take an opposing view. 
From nearly opposite ends of the nineteenth century and opposite sides of an attitude 
towards narcissism, Shelley and Nietzsche are in a way opposing mirror images of each 
other. 
Ideally this would be part of a larger study, which would trace the Narcissisus 
theme across several centuries.  It might be especially fruitful to examine the treatment of 
this theme after Nietzsche's time, in the poetry of Rainer Marie Rilke or in Oscar Wilde's 
novel The Picture of Dorian Gray, and later in the psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan, to 
name a few of its more prominent appearances.   Instances of it both earlier in the 
nineteenth century and in previous centuries would also contribute to a larger picture of 
this theme and what its manifestations have to say about those works of literature, their 
authors and the cultures from which they originate.  The present study might form a core 
of that larger inquiry; for perhaps no one work of the nineteenth century affords a broader 
view of this theme and its reflection of its time than Frankenstein; and perhaps no author 
of the same century gives a more dramatic instance of its transformation within so short a 
time span, and of the intellectual and cultural transformations this reflects, than 
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Nietzsche.  With respect to Nietzsche particularly, this study is also significant in the 
closer look it affords themes in the philosopher's writings that have continued to exert 
profound influence on philosophy, literature and culture up to the present.  
 Analysis of the theme must begin with an examination of Ovid’s narration, which 
serves as a sort of basis or point of departure from which shifts and transformations in the 
narcissistic theme can be further examined.  Examination of Ovid's tale reveals strands 
that can be traced in much later manifestations of the theme, and reflect certain core 
insights that are strikingly resonant still.  The first main section will focus on Shelley’s 
novel Frankenstein, where the theme revolves around two characters, the hero Victor 
Frankenstein and his creature.  Through the portrayal of a character who is driven by mad 
ambitions and delusions of grandeur and who even in his ruination never entirely 
abandons a basically narcissistic pose, and his “shadow image” or “alter-ego” whose self-
narration contains overt reference to Narcissus (mediated, that is, by Milton’s use of the 
myth) the novel portrays a “narcissistic split” in the self already thematized in Ovid’s 
story.9  The final section will consist of an analysis of narcissism in Nietzsche’s Zur 
Genealogie der Moral.  In this work Nietzsche assumes, one could even say flaunts, a 
narcissistic posture—in a manner not unlike Shelley’s tragic hero Frankenstein, though, 
as has already been mentioned, quite in opposition to the spirit of her novel.   
                                                 
9
 In order to avoid confusion later, it should be noted here that in this study, 
Frankenstein's creature is not understood as a narcissistic figure.  Rather the creature fills 
two primary roles with respect to this literary theme:  he is (from Frankenstein's 
perspective) the monstrous outcome of the protagonist's narcissistic ambitions, and the 











OVID’S STORY OF NARCISSUS 
 
 
Though Ovid’s version of Narcissus is the one that has come down to us, several 
versions of the tale were known in antiquity.10  In his version of the story, Ovid combines 
the story with another originally unrelated to it:  the story of Echo, the garrulous 
mountain nymph who brought upon herself the wrath of Juno by thwarting her in her 
attempts to catch other nymphs in their dalliances with Jove.  Echo detained Juno with 
her chatter until the other nymphs could flee her wrath, and for this was punished with 
speech limited to the end of whatever utterances she heard.  When Echo becomes 
enamoured with Narcissus, she conceals herself in the woods and echoes back to him his 
own words.  This intrigues him and piques his desire to meet her until she shows herself, 
when he cruelly spurns her.  She pines away for him, wasting away until nothing but her 
voice remains.  Echo’s presence in the Narcissus story gives it greater thematic unity, for 
she bridges the themes of spurned love and self-infatuation, as well as those of self and 
other.  She pre-figures Narcissus’ enchanting self-encounter, while also becoming the 
only fully formed character among his would-be lovers, and the only character the reader 
can really feel for.  As such, she deepens a sense in which Narcissus brings upon himself 
                                                 
10
 For a synopsis of other versions of the Narcissus tale in antiquity, see Louise 
Vinge, The Narcissus Theme in Western European Literature up to the Early 19th 
Century, (Lund:  Gleerups, 1967) 19-22. 
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his own fate through his cruelty—and more broadly, through the violation of some 
mysterious principle of the proper relationship to oneself and to others.   
It is the ironic mix of innocence and culpability in Narcissus that gives Ovid’s 
telling of this story its peculiar depth and complexity.  The initial descriptions of 
Narcissus emphasize his hard-heartedness, on account of which a scorned admirer utters 
this curse against him:  “‘sic amet ipse licet, sic non potiatur amato!’”  (“‘May Narcissus/ 
Love one day, so, himself, and not win over/ The creature whom he loves!’”) 11 Nemesis 
grants this prayer, which is described as “precibus…justis,” “[a] righteous…plea” (l. 
406), conveying the overt sense that Narcissus is in some way deserving of his fate; yet 
there is an element of innocence in it as well.  As in other tales in the Metamorphoses in 
which the innocence of the ill-fated character is more clear, Narcissus accidentally 
happens upon the encounter that seals his fate, and as the narrative makes clear, he does 
not know at first that it is his own image that has enchanted him:  “sed videat, nescit,” 
(“what he sees, [he does not know]”) (l. 430)—or, in the words of the oracle, he does not 
yet “know himself.”  Ironically, from his own perspective, his “hard-heartedness” is 
being overcome by love of another.  Spaas has pointed out, “if identity means, in the first 
instance, recognising oneself, it would seem that Narcissus’ failure to recognize himself 
denotes a lack of identity” (Spaas 7).  Not only is Narcissus’ self-enamorment unwitting, 
but without a sense of identity that distinguishes himself from others, it can hardly have 
been expected of him that he should have had the capacity for compassion for Echo or the 
                                                 
11
 Ovid, Metamorphoses, ed. William S. Anderson (Norman:  University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1996) 98, l. 405. 
Ovid, Metamorphoses, trans. Wolfe Humphries (Bloomington:  Indiana 
University Press, 1955) 70, l. 405.  Quotes in Latin followed by English translations are 
cited with a single reference indicating page number from these two references.  Brackets 
indicate words that have been changed to reflect a more literal translation. 
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others who loved him; for compassion requires the ability to enter into feelings one 
doesn’t share (or reciprocate), and thus depends in the first place upon a sense of self as 
distinct from others.  Without a firm “sense of self,” Narcissus’ “hardness” can only have 
been choosiness that is finally overcome by love for another—once he has finally found 
an “equal”—and this is hardly justification for his hard fate.  In spite of the overtly 
negative light cast upon Narcissus, innocence on some level plays a central role in the 
narration. 
 But this role is also paradoxical, as is already implicit in the observation that 
Narcissus has finally found his “equal”—a nonsensical assertion if Narcissus has no prior 
“sense of self.”   Though essential to the dramatic tension of the story, there is a profound 
irony inherent in Narcissus’ “innocence,” into which a closer look at Ovid’s language in 
his initial description of Narcissus allows us a deeper look: 
 multi illum iuvenes, multae cupiere puellae;  
 sed (fuit in tenera tam dura superbia forma) 
 nulli illum iuvenes, nullae tetigere puellae. 
 
    …and boys and girls 
 Both sought his love, but in that [tender] stripling 
 Was pride so fierce no boy, no girl, could touch him.  (Ovid 97& 68, ll. 353-55) 
 
Narcissus’ “hard pride” (“dura superbia”) implies that his hardness of heart does bear 
something more like a sense of relation to others:  a sense of superiority towards them.  
At the same time, within his “tender form” (“tenera…forma”) which encloses it in the 
phrase, his “hard pride” foreshadows the fact that a “tender” vulnerability of his own will 
be subjected to the same hardness within him as have those in the mirrored lines 
preceding and following this one, which tell of the boys and girls who desired him but 
could not touch him:  “multi illum iuvenes, multae cupiere puellae; /…/ nulli illum 
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iuvenes, nullae tetigere puellae.”  As has been mentioned before, even before he falls into 
unwitting enamorment with himself, there have already been inklings of this proclivity 
for self-fascination and infatuation, and the disposition to choose these above love of 
another, in his encounter with Echo.  As she, unseen, echoes his own words back to him, 
he becomes more anxious to see her, and his cries become more and more lively: 
“‘veni!.../ quid…me fugis? /...huc coeamus,’”  (“‘come!.../Why do you [flee] me?/…Let 
us [come] together’”) (Ovid 97&69, ll. 382-86).  It is only when she reveals herself to 
him that he heartlessly rejects her—thus making her into the retreating and vanishing 
being that he reproaches her for being while she keeps herself from his sight.  
Interestingly, her invisibility in this passage has the same effect as the water in which he 
is to view himself; that is, it seems to promise to his self-directed desire something that 
reality cannot deliver.  In the case of Echo, she is not himself; in the case of his image, he 
cannot have what he sees.  And here lies perhaps the essence and tragedy of his 
despairing passion:  the paradox that his image is the be-all and end-all of his desires, 
something more wonderful than reality, and at the same time nothingness:  that it must be 
one to be the other.  While an element of innocence lends an essential dramatic 
poignancy to the story, that poignancy loses all depth when that innocence is viewed as 
pure, straightforward and without irony, his cruelty as entirely without understanding, his 
ignorance of himself without a certain knowing choice. 
 Andreoli, in his analysis of Ovid’s narrative, speaks of a “split” that occurs (or 
rather, is “internalized”) at the moment Narcissus realizes the image he sees is his own.  
Before this moment, according to Andreoli, 
Narcissus is fully Narcissus; the reflection that he sees is, to him someone 
other than himself, independent of him; only the narrator and the reader 
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know that these two are one.  There is a split here, but it has not yet been 
internalized, separating the one in whom it occurs from himself.  
Nevertheless, without being fully aware of it, Narcissus is already 
objectified and alienated, but only into his own image.12 
 
This “split” Andreoli defines as a division “between essence and appearances, self and 
self-awareness” (Andreoli 21).  On one hand, from Narcissus’ point of view, this split is 
first “internalized” in the realization, born of his self-recognition, that he can never 
possess what he sees as he might possess another.  On the other hand, paradoxically it is 
also the opposite (or the reverse image) of a “split,” for in his self-recognition a split 
between himself and his image is also mended, unified into a sense of identity (“let us 
come together,” we recall he cried to Echo when she had echoed his own words back to 
him).    
Spaas has observed, in all this reflection and illusion, an analogy between Ovid’s 
story and Lacan’s concept of identity formation:  “Lacan talks, as Ovid does, about an 
illusion, but for the psychoanalyst, the ‘illusion’ is part of an identification process” 
(Spaas 4).  Spaas points out an uncanny parallel between the story and Lacan’s theories 
of the “self,” according to which the “self” is an illusory construct formed in an 
experience of “otherness”:  the child’s reflection in the mirror.  In Lacan’s model of 
identity, the “self” is born at the same moment a primal sense of wholeness and unity 
(with the mother, from whom the child formerly does not distinguish itself) is forever 
lost.  As in the Narcissus story, the individual acquires a sense of identity at the moment 
it becomes divided from itself.  This coming to “know [one]self” represents a descent 
from an original integrity of being, the longing for which the child invests in this “other,” 
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 Max Andreoli, “Narcissus and his Double,” in Echoes of Narcissus, ed. Lieve 
Spaas (New York, Oxford:  Berghahn Books, 2000) 16. 
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intruder self.  From a Lacanian perspective, the story of Narcissus can be considered the 
quintessential narrative of self-alienation and unfulfilled longing that inevitably follow 
upon the experience of the self:  Narcissus’ fate is the fate of us all. 
But if this were a satisfactory interpretation of Ovid’s tale, there would be no need 
for Echo, nor, in fact, for any characterization of Narcissus; any potential “self” would 
do.  On the contrary, Echo is essential to the story, as is Narcissus’ heartlessness towards 
her, without which the story remains on the level of the tales of “outraged innocence” 13 
in the Metamorphoses which it resembles, but from which it differs importantly. It is 
likewise important that it is not Echo but another, otherwise unknown character, who 
calls down Narcissus’ fate upon him, for otherwise it would be a more or less 
straightforward tale of retribution.  Both kinds of tales occur in the Metamorphoses; but 
the story of Narcissus is characterized by greater symmetry and deeper irony, for it is 
held in exquisite tension by the interplay of innocence and culpability mentioned earlier.  
Viewing the tale as a mere metaphor for the longing inevitably following from a 
Lacanian construction of the self robs the story of this essential tension, and thus of one 
of its most poignant dimensions.  It has been pointed out earlier that Narcissus’ “dura 
superbia,” closed within his “tenera…forma” (l. 354) and this line itself enclosed within 
those which tell of the youths and girls who desire but could not touch him—that this 
elaborately mirrored construction foreshadows Narcissus falling upon the same “hard 
pride” that others have fallen upon.  The overt symmetry of Narcissus’ fate, which 
corresponds to the poetic symmetry of these lines, underscores the irony that he is 
withheld from himself as he has withheld himself from others.  His “hard pride” is 
                                                 
13
 Leonard Barkan, “Diana and Actaeon:  The Myth as Synthesis,” English 
Literary Renaissance 10 (1980):  321. 
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mirrored in his hard fate; figuratively he has fallen upon it himself.  But is there a less 
figurative, more direct sense in which Narcissus can be said to suffer from his own pride 
as others have suffered from it:  a sense in which he can he be said to withhold himself 
from himself? 
In seeking an answer to this question, hints both within the narrative and in 
secondary literature on the story suggest themselves.  A striking one is what Narcissus 
says as he pleads with his own image, questioning why it hides itself from him:  “‘quid 
me, puer unice, fallis / quove petitus abis?  Certe nec forma nec aetas / est mea quam 
fugias, et amarunt me quoque nymphae.’” (“‘Why do you tease me so?  Where do you 
go/ When I am reaching for you?  I am surely/ Neither so old or ugly as to scare you,/ 
And nymphs have been in love with me.’”) (Ovid 71&99, ll. 454-56).  Here Narcissus 
betrays an understanding that others have suffered on account of him in the same way he 
now suffers in not being able to possess his beloved.  He has understood, while remaining 
hard to, the suffering he has caused; and thus he inadvertently brings forward an 
admission of his own cruelty as an argument against the supposed cruelty of his own 
beloved—just at the moment when he is about to realize it is himself, whom he likewise 
will never have.   Ovid’s narrative places Narcissus in the same position with respect to 
himself as his previous wooers, and with the same result.  On a more interpretive level, 
he has already chosen to “remain within himself,” rather than letting sympathy with those 
others draw him out of himself—at the very moment this “remaining within himself” is 
becoming his inescapable fate.  
Another hint is Andreoli’s observation that there is a certain overt discrepancy in 
the prophecy of Narcissus’ fate, that he would live a long life, “‘ si se non noverit’”  (“‘if 
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he never knows himself’”) (Ovid 97, l. 348).  Andreoli argues, “such an oracle seems 
non-sensical; however, like all oracles, its difficulty lies in an excess, rather than a lack of 
meaning….Narcissus comes to see and desire himself, but to say that he ‘knows’ himself 
is an abuse of vocabulary” (Andreoli 15).  This observation is followed by a somewhat 
elaborate argument that Narcissus, in order not to succumb to the fate of the oracle, must 
never let himself become divided from himself, between “the subject of ‘knows’ (noverit) 
and the reflexive ‘himself’ (se)” by becoming an object to anybody—which is why he 
must resist the pursuits of all those enamored with him.  He “must remain a pure subject” 
(15).   That Narcissus should have made such a minutely grammatical and arcane analysis 
of the oracle in order to prevent its coming to pass seems a doubtful interpretation.  On 
one level, the oracle is to be taken more literally than Andreoli is understanding it:  
Narcissus’ misfortune lies in coming to “know” his own appearance; nevertheless 
Andreoli does seem to have pinpointed a certain deep irony:  that in spite of the oracle, in 
a fundamental sense, Narcissus’ fate does not lie in having come to “know himself.”  The 
opposite seems more true:  that Narcissus is enamored with a vision of beauty that is 
entirely superficial and illusory.  If this is what it means to “know oneself,” then the self 
must be an illusion as well, and coming to “know oneself” an experience of “self-
estrangement”—as Lacan held it to be.  In that case, Narcissus’ oracle is in a sense true of 
all of us:  all who come to “know ourselves” must, like Narcissus, cling amorously to a 
false image or lose ourselves entirely, for a truer sense of coming to “know oneself” does 
not exist.   
But a larger sense in which Narcissus comes to “know himself” that is, I believe, 
more in keeping with the spirit of Ovid’s narration, lies in the larger principle of justice 
  
22
operating.  His fate was brought upon him by Nemesis for his cruelty, which he would 
have needed to “look beyond himself”—that is, beyond the superficial, illusory self to a 
truer self-recognition—to see.  This recognition is forced upon Narcissus mainly from 
our perspective, for literally he is doomed never to “look beyond himself,” and self-
knowledge beyond the superficial beauty that enchanted him so hopelessly is forever 
withheld.  Nevertheless, even if it does not quite constitute self-knowledge, Narcissus 
comes to “know himself” in being dealt the same treatment that he dealt others—a fact of 
which the inadvertent admissions of his own cruelty betray a dim recognition. 
Here we have happened upon another essential “split” present in the narration:  
the split between Narcissus’ perspective and ours.  If Narcissus’ inkling of insight into 
himself and the justice of his fate does not constitute “self-knowledge,” it all the more 
points to Narcissus’ “real self” as distinct from the superficial, illusory “self” that 
fascinates him—a “real self” at least in the sense of who he “really” is from the narrative 
perspective.  The image he sees is one of transcendent beauty and perfection:  “spectat 
humi positus geminum, sua lumina, sidus/ et dignos Baccho, dignos et Apolline crines/ 
inpubesque genas et eburnean colla…,” (“Lying prone/ He sees his eyes, twin stars, and 
locks as comely/ As those of Bacchus or the god Apollo/ Smooth cheeks, and ivory 
neck…”) (98&70, ll. 420-22).  Nor is there any sign of the harsh and unfeeling pride with 
which he has made others acquainted:  “spem mihi nescio quam vultu promittis amico,/ 
cumque ego porrexi tibi brachia, porrigis ultro; cum risi, adrides; lacrimas quoque saepe 
notavi/ me lacrimante tuas; nutu quoque signa remittis…,” (“You promise,/ I think, some 
hope with a look of more than friendship./ You reach out arms when I do, and your smile/ 
Follows my smiling; I have seen your tears/ When I was tearful; you nod and beckon 
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when I do;) (99&71, ll. 457-60).  The mirror imagery in this passage is particularly 
fascinating in several regards, not the least of which are the various ways the bewitching 
image is both himself and not himself:  an image that looks like him but tragically is not 
him; one that can be in perfect sympathy (and symmetry) for the paradoxical reason that 
it does not share his will, for it has no will of its own; one that shows none of the 
hardness and cruelty—indeed contains none, for it has no content—that in “reality” his 
loveliness concealed.  In Narcissus’ own words, the tragic irony of his passion is that he 
and his beloved cannot be separated:  “o utinam a nostro secedere corpore possem!/ 
votum in amante novum:  vellem, quod amamus, abesset!”  (“‘if I could only—/ How 
curious a prayer from any lover—/ Be parted from my love!’”) (99-100&72, ll. 467-68).  
The deeper irony is that this wish depends on its never being fulfilled, for he is the same 
Narcissus who does not venture outside himself to feel for anyone else.  He is not drawn 
to his own image as one is drawn to an actual other—any more than this was the case 
when he was drawn to Echo.  Nor is it really himself, but a self-reflecting ideal that has 
smitten him; and only as long as his beloved remained unattainable—hidden away in the 
reality of himself that he didn’t know and would never know, a reality unreflected in the 
perfect image he beheld—could his reflected self remain ideal:  a beautiful facade 
without the hard reality that soon disillusioned his other admirers.  In the end, the 
profoundest “split” in the story of Narcissus is that between the reality and this more 
flattering ideal:  Narcissus’ “ideal self” and who he really is.  
The idealization in Narcissus’ self-vision is prefigured in the descriptions of the 
medium:  the pool in which he beholds himself, whose foreboding pristineness is 
described in mirroring language and other detail that invites notice: 
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Fons erat inlimis, nitidis argenteus undis, 
Quem neque pastores neque pastae monte capellae 
Contigerant aliudve pecus, quem nulla volucris 
Nec fer turbarat nec lapsus ab arbore ramus;  
 
There was a pool, silver with shining water, 
To which no shepherds came, no goats, no cattle, 
Whose glass no bird, no beast, no falling [branch] 
Had ever troubled. (98&70, ll. 407-410)  
 
This elaborate description of the pool establishes it as the ideal medium for Narcissus to 
view himself vividly; but the descriptions are certainly superfluous if that is their only 
purpose.  The pool is not merely “clear” but “silver with shining waters”; it is not only 
smooth and undisturbed at the opportune time, but “no beast or bird” (“nulla volucris/ nec 
fer”) has ever stirred (“turbarat”, literally “fouled”) it.  The specific creatures from which 
the pool has been kept unspoiled are lowly ones:  domestic animals and those who keep 
them.  It is untouched as Narcissus is.  In fact the pool is the inanimate counterpart of 
Narcissus:  pure, virginal, unsullied, but also untouched by any realities, somehow 
magically set apart from the real world:  the ideal medium for an idealized image to be 
inscribed upon.   But even “inscribed” implies a lasting change effected upon it; on this 
pool reflections only flit like phantoms upon the surface—are wholly incorporeal:  “ista 
repercussae, quam cernis, imaginis umbra est:/ nil habet ista sui:  tecum venitque 
manetque,/ tecum discedet, sit tu discedere possis.” (“[That] vision [which you perceive] 
is only shadow,/ Only reflection [lit. reflected image], lacking any substance./  It comes 
with you, it stays with you, it goes/ Away with you, if you can go away”) (Ovid 99&71, 
ll. 434-36).  Once again mirror imagery is built into the poetic language itself, especially 
in the first line of the above passage, in which “repercussae” and “imaginis” 
(“reflected…image”) agree with each other, enclosed within “ista” and “umbra” 
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(“that…shadow”) that are grammatically linked, mediated by perception (“quam cernis,” 
“which you perceive”).  Mirror imagery and virginal unreality are joined in the 
narcissistic subject. 
To appreciate what Ovid is doing with the tale of Narcissus, it is necessary to do 
what Narcissus never does, but which the story beckons us to do through him:  to look 
below the surface and see the thematic symmetry corresponding to the visual.  For as 
with Narcissus himself, appearances are deceiving.  Most other tales of unfortunate 
mortals in the Metamorphoses involve an asymmetry between the character and his or her 
fate.  Even when all the characters are not as innocent as Io—even when, within the 
mythological framework at least, characters such as Pentheus or Niobe seem to invite 
their own fate—the punishment is nevertheless externally imposed, and there is no 
necessary sense of its proportion to the crime.  Because this is overtly the case with 
Narcissus, there is something sweetly sad and stirring in his fate that wins our sympathy; 
for who cannot sympathize with unrequited love, especially of one so beautiful?  The fact 
that the two are the same might jar slightly; but this was unwitting and an understandable 
error on Narcissus’ part.  The spell is only really broken by the recollection of his cruelty, 
especially towards Echo.  She represents the decisive “asymmetry” in the story, for she is 
the real “other,” who, the story seems to say, might have drawn him out of himself and 
the symmetry of inwardness:14  her love might have humanized Narcissus.  He chooses 
instead a “false other”:  an “idealized self,” a perfect reflection of his loveliness and the 
annulment of that in himself which is the antithesis of love:  his unfeeling pride and 
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that which interferes with the  illusion. 
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cruelty.  Nevertheless the encounter with this idealized self is in one sense an encounter 
with Narcissus’ “real self”—or at least with reality—for it is equally cruel in withholding 
from him what he desires; and were it to deliver what he desired, it would no longer be 
what he desired.  It is the perfect symmetrical conundrum; for emptiness cannot satisfy 
desire, and substance is what the idealized self cannot support.   
Spaas seems to have made a key insight when he speaks of water imagery in the 
tale acting “as a mirror opening onto the depths of oneself, a self that tends to become 
idealized” (Spaas 2).  I would differ in one important point, that the idealized self in the 
story has no depths—if anything, it is rather a flight from them; in fact, its lack of all 
depth and substance is its most salient characteristic:  “crudele, quid frustra simulacra 
fugacia captas?/ quod petis, est nusquam;” (“Why try to catch an always fleeing image,/ 









MARY SHELLEY’S FRANKENSTEIN 
 
 
 Before proceeding to a discussion of the Narcissus theme in Frankenstein, it 
might be useful to sum up a few salient points in the analysis of Ovid’s story that will be 
of particular significance in examining the presence of the theme in Shelley’s novel.  
First and perhaps foremost is the idealization of the narcissistic “self”.  It is not really the 
self with which the narcissistic figure is enamored, but an image of the self that is in 
some important way an improvement on the original—in part at least (in Narcissus’ case 
perhaps wholly) because it lacks that which is essentially unlovable in the original.  In 
this it is a flight from the reality of the “self” that one desires, from the truth of who one 
really is; and this creates, especially in the case of fictional characters in which this self-
idealization is thematized, a disconnect between a character's self-image and how we 
view them.  Thus narcissism is a  paradox of self-“knowledge” and self-deception—a 
paradox beautifully thematized in Ovid's story.  Such self-idealization creates an image 
that is both more wondrous than what reality can fulfill, and something essentially 
without content:  a “shadow,” a “fleeing image.”  Second is the split in the “self” 
engendered by idealized self-enamorment.  That the object of one’s desire is idealized 
might not distinguish it from any other infatuation; but because the object of narcissistic 
desire is “oneself,” such desire creates an insurmountable gap between the image and the 
reality of who one is.  But the divergence is felt only in the unfulfillment; for from the 
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narcissist’s point of view, there might be no reason to believe that this idealized self 
could not be real, or the desire for it not realizable “in an ideal world.”  There is a 
symmetry of inwardness15 in narcissistic desire, such as we saw in Ovid's story, that 
depends on the “false other” that one has become to oneself; a real “other” has no place 
in it and is only a disruption to the pleasing symmetry.    This leads to the final salient 
point in the foregoing analysis of Ovid’s story:  an inability to feel for the “real other,” 
reflected in the scorn and cruelty Narcissus shows towards Echo at the moment she 
ceases to reflect himself and shows herself to be an “other”—the proper object of feeling 
whom he denies it, to lavish it upon a “shadow…lacking any substance.”  For Narcissus, 
the symmetry of desire becomes the symmetry of fate, whereby he is dealt the same 
unfeeling denial of himself, likewise at his own hands. 
 The appearance of the Narcissus myth in Shelley’s novel, as well as Milton’s 
allusion to the myth in Paradise Lost which seems to have inspired Shelley's reference, 
are among the most prominent manifestations of the story in Western literature.  
Considering the temporal and cultural distance of both of these writers from Ovid, there 
is an astonishing consistency of treatment with respect to this theme—notwithstanding its 
metamorphosis of form, particularly in Shelley’s novel.  Shelley subverts Milton’s 
allusion to the myth, applying the motif of self-enchantment to a tale of self-horror.  Her 
elaborate transformation of the Narcissus theme creates an entirely new being from it, 
analogous to the creation brought to life by her tragic protagonist; but also like  
Frankenstein’s creature, the humanity in Ovid’s tale is still present.  Though brief, the 
overt allusion to the Narcissus myth in Frankenstein is unmistakable and resonates 
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deeply in the story, diffusing itself throughout the novel’s major themes.  It takes place 
near the middle of the novel, within the narration of Frankenstein’s creature.  This 
narration is contained within Frankenstein’s own, itself within the narration of Captain 
Walton’s letters to his sister.  This elaborate narrative structure bears some comparison to 
the mirroring lines surrounding Ovid’s characterization of Narcissus—a comparison that 
is more interesting for the fact that the monster’s story is framed by two essentially 
narcissistic points of view.  Both Frankenstein and Walton have been driven by the desire 
for glory which they have been willing to pursue at any cost, even having proven capable 
of sacrificing others to realize their ambitions. 
 In his self-narration, Frankenstein’s creature tells of the life he has led from the 
time of his creation and abandonment by his horrified creator up to his interview with 
Frankenstein, during which he has been forced to wander alone in the world without 
shelter or human companionship.  He seeks both from the De Lacey family, hiding 
himself in a hut next to their cottage in the woods from which he observes them and 
learns the use of language, eventually making a disastrous attempt to form a relationship 
with them.  It is here that he first catches a glimpse of his own image: 
 I had admired the perfect forms of my cottagers—their grace, 
beauty, and delicate complexions:  but how was I terrified, when I viewed 
myself in a transparent pool!  At first I started back, unable to believe that 
it was indeed I who was reflected in the mirror; and when I became fully 
convinced that I was in reality the monster that I am, I was filled with the 
bitterest sensations of despondence and mortification.  Alas!  I did not yet 
entirely know the fatal effects of this miserable deformity.16 
 
Though the monster’s terror and despair upon seeing his image “in a transparent 
pool” clearly seems Shelley's own twist on Narcissus’ tragic tale, surprisingly few critics 
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have noted the allusion.  One of the few who has, Terry Thompson, discusses the “subtle 
and quite poignant parallels” between Narcissus and Frankenstein’s monster, pointing out 
that both are doomed by their appearance:  The monster “will never be able to escape the 
power of his ugliness, just as Narcissus could never escape the power of his beauty.”17  
Thompson observes that this subtle allusion to the “enduring power of the Narcissus 
myth…turns the myth on its head” (Thompson 21), but he stops short of pursuing the 
implications of the myth or this treatment of it in the story.  Still fewer critics have noted 
that this moment in the story is not simply an allusion to the Narcissus myth, but more 
directly an allusion to Eve in Milton’s Paradise Lost—a work that looms large in the 
novel, which contains a number of elaborate allusions to and parallels with the epic 
poem.  Like Frankenstein’s creature, Eve tells of her own creation and wanderings in 
Paradise where, like Narcissus, she happens upon a pool and is charmed by her own 
reflection:  “As I bent down to look, just opposite / A shape within the wat’ry gleam 
appeared / Bended to look on me:  I started back, / it started back, but pleased I soon 
returned, / Pleased it returned as soon with answering looks / Of sympathy and 
love;….”18  It is particularly noteworthy that the creature uses Eve’s precise wording to 
describe his reaction to his own image:  “I started back.” This signals a deliberate 
parallel; and yet the difference is as important as the similarity:  Eve “starts” in wonder, 
Frankenstein's creature in terror.  Eve’s emotion upon her self-discovery is similar to 
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Narcissus’, the creature’s is the opposite of both; his self-horror at his own reflection is a 
subversion of both allusions.   
A wider presence in the novel of similarly subverted allusions to Paradise Lost 
has led several critics to interpret the novel itself as a subversion of Milton’s work.  In her 
feminist reading of the novel, Sandra Gilbert, one of the few critics to note specifically 
Shelley’s allusion to Eve, interprets it as “a corrective to Milton’s blindness about Eve:  
Having been created second, inferior, a mere rib, how could she possibly, this passage 
implies, have seemed anything but monstrous to herself?”19  Earlier in her article Gilbert 
has asserted—in fact, her argument largely rests upon the premise—that the absence of 
allusion to Eve in the novel stands in stark contrast to parallels with the other main 
figures in Paradise Lost, and actually signifies Eve’s presence in all the parts (Gilbert 
57):  a position that is somewhat contradicted by her own observation of a clear parallel 
between the monster and Eve.  Before proceeding to the next critic who has commented 
upon allusion to Paradise Lost in the novel, it would be useful to examine the allusion to 
Eve and Gilbert's conclusions about it more closely. 
The parody of Eve’s innocent self-desire in the monster’s self-horror has further 
resonance in Frankenstein’s own reaction to his creation, which parallels the monster’s 
reaction to himself:  like his creation, he also recoils in horror.  Relating to Walton the 
story of his project of “infusing life into an inanimate body,” Frankenstein tells him: 
For this I had deprived myself of rest and health.  I had desired it with an 
ardour that far exceeded moderation; but now that I had finished, the 
beauty of the dream had vanished, and breathless horror and disgust filled 
my heart.  Unable to endure the aspect of the being I had created, I rushed 
out of the room…. (Shelley 61)  
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As for his creation upon seeing himself, in the passage discussed earlier, Frankenstein's 
revulsion in this passage is also self-horror.  It is bound up with the disappointment of the 
ambitions he had invested in his endeavors and the renown they would bring him, as he 
relates earlier:  “Soon my mind was filled with one thought, one conception, one purpose.  
So much has been done, exclaimed the soul of Frankenstein,—more, far more, will I 
achieve:  treading in the steps already marked, I will pioneer a new way, explore 
unknown powers, and unfold to the world the deepest mysteries of creation” (53).  When 
this ambition deadens him to all other aspirations and pleasures, reverence for life and 
death, the beauties of nature and desire for intercourse with others, it is this deathliness he 
beholds with horror in the dead creature he has brought to life; and he sees in him the 
guilt of his own ambitions and his arrogance in having carried them out, referring to the 
monster as “the demoniacal corpse to which I had so miserably given life” (61).  At this 
point in the story, the monster has not become demoniacal; Frankenstein’s own narration 
seems to indicate that the epithet is a more apt description of himself and what his mad 
drives had made him than of his creature:  “Who shall conceive the horrors of my secret 
toil, as I dabbled among the unhallowed damps of the grave, or tortured the living animal 
to animate the lifeless clay?...a resistless, and almost frantic, impulse urged me forward; I 
seemed to have lost all soul or sensation but for this one pursuit” (58).  Thus begins a 
pattern that continues throughout the rest of the novel:  Frankenstein attributes a demonic 
nature to his creature because he sees in him his own guilt:  both the acknowledged guilt 
of having created him, and the unacknowledged guilt of having abandoned him (which 
does, in a sense, turn his creature into the demon Frankenstein portrays him to be).  In 
short, Frankenstein sees in his creature a reflection of himself.  Before he realizes his 
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ambitions, this reflection is idealized.  It embodies what Frankenstein aspires to be:  the 
sublime scientific mind whose achievements surpass all others before him.  From the 
moment he brings his creation to life, the image is a shattered one (though still idealized, 
as we shall later see).  Thus the creature’s self-horror is a pattern of Frankenstein’s own, 
which thus also carries resonances of Eve’s innocent self-enchantment—or rather, the 
subversion of this.  Contrary to Gilbert’s assertion, Eve’s presence in the novel is as 
prominent as that of the main male figures in Paradise Lost—God, Adam and Satan—
whose parallels with Frankenstein and his creature are also multiple and complex, and 
often likewise subverted.    
Nevertheless Gilbert’s interpretation raises an interesting question:  why does 
Shelley treat the allusion to Eve (and through her, to Narcissus) subversively?  Whether 
or not there is any foundation to Gilbert’s claim that Frankenstein is a “corrective to 
Milton’s blindness about Eve,” such use of allusion could still signal a subversive 
approach to Milton’s work itself—that is, an effort to undermine the poet’s creation or 
the world view it presents, or perhaps the poet’s status in the Western literary tradition.   
Such a view is put forward in John Lamb’s article, “Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein 
and Milton’s Monstrous Myth,” in which he argues that Shelley’s design for her novel 
was to topple that great monolith of literary influence, Paradise Lost, which held the 
British literary tradition firmly in its grip in the nineteenth century.20  He focuses on the 
monster’s “fall,” arguing that although it invites comparisons to the fall of Satan from 
Heaven and to Adam and Eve’s fall from grace, it can only be meaningfully understood 
as a “fall” into language and culture.  According to this argument, the monster, whose 
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reading of Paradise Lost figures importantly in his own story, absorbs a world-view 
informed by that work, in which the individual is an autonomous entity, “By nature free, 
not over-rul’d by Fate / Inextricable, or strict necessity” (Milton Bk. V, ll. 527-28). Lamb 
calls this the “bourgeois ideal of the individual,” claiming it had become firmly 
entrenched by the nineteenth century, to the exclusion of all other conceptualizations of 
the self (Lamb 305). 
According to Lamb, the monster’s enculturation especially through Milton also 
deceives him into a false belief in language and its efficacy in accomplishing his 
purposes.  When language inevitably fails him, the monster assumes the predetermined 
cultural identity set up for him by Milton’s monolithic work.  So deep is the monster’s 
identification with the system of identities engendered through “Milton’s myth of 
identity” that he must kill to defend it; his murders are “necessary acts of self-
preservation,” and symbolize “the way in which hegemonic systems preserve themselves 
through the destruction of alternate systems of meaning and value” (316).   
Interpretations such as Gilbert's and Lamb's, which posit a fundamentally critical 
attitude towards Milton in Shelley's novel, do not seem consistent with Shelley’s praise 
of Milton in her preface to her novel, where she expresses rather the desire to emulate 
than to undermine Milton: 
 I have thus endeavored to preserve the truth of the elementary 
principles of human nature, while I have not scrupled to innovate upon 
their combinations.  The Iliad, the tragic poetry of Greece—Shakespeare, 
in The Tempest and Midsummer Night’s Dream,—and most especially 
Milton, in Paradise Lost, conform to this rule....(Shelley 26) 
 
There does not seem to be anything ironic in this praise; if there were, the same irony 
must also apply to several other of the most renowned poets of the Western tradition.  
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Such sweeping ironic intent seems implausible, and at the very least would require more 
evidence to establish than Shelley gives us here.  If it is not meant ironically, it is difficult 
to understand why Shelley would take an undermining approach to an author whom she 
has expressed a clear desire to emulate in such an important respect.  The passage gives 
us reason to suppose that Shelley means to communicate something different in her 
transformation of Eve and Narcissus through Frankenstein’s monster and Frankenstein 
himself.  Since we know nothing more directly about Shelley’s attitudes toward Milton or 
her literary purposes than what she has indicated here, we can only examine and compare 
the parallel passages in as far as Milton’s narration seems relevant to an interpretation of 
Shelley’s.  
 Perhaps it is most crucial to examine the circumstances (those within the works 
themselves) surrounding the narrations being compared:  in particular what has led up to 
them, since this may account for the similarities and differences between them.  Both 
narrations are being told to someone:  Eve’s to Adam, the monster’s to Frankenstein.  
This is not a precise parallel, since Frankenstein is the monster’s creator, whereas Adam 
is Eve’s mate; if Eve’s narration were directed towards her creator, it would need to be 
addressed to God.  The difference is more significant than an exact parallel would be, 
given the larger circumstances that the monster has no mate, and this is precisely the 
motive of the monster’s narrative:  to demand that Frankenstein create one for him.  “You 
must create a female for me, with whom I can live in the interchange of those sympathies 
necessary for my being.  This you alone can do; and I demand it of you as a right which 
you must not refuse to concede” (Shelley 128).  This is a parody of the Genesis story of 
creation, in which God creates woman as a companion for man:  “Then the Lord God 
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said, ‘It is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him a helper as his 
partner.’”21 This story is not specifically told in Paradise Lost, which begins its narration 
after the creation of Adam and Eve, nor is it specifically related in the words of its 
characters; but it is foundational in the story upon which Paradise Lost is based.  We 
know from Frankenstein’s own account that his creature’s needs played a role neither in 
his creation nor in Frankenstein’s response to his creature.  The monster’s murderous 
nature results from this neglect and his ensuing misery and isolation.  Throughout the 
novel Frankenstein seems insensible to the guilt he has incurred toward the monster in 
having made him miserable; and in the wake of the monster’s murders, both before the 
monster’s demand for a companion and in revenge for Frankenstein’s refusal, 
Frankenstein expresses wracking guilt and remorse over having brought a “demon” into 
the world, but never for having made him that way.  
The monster’s demand for the basic necessity of companionship, and the thematic 
subversion of the biblical creator-creature relationship it represents, underscores 
Frankenstein’s fundamental failure as a creator.  Frankenstein acknowledges a sense of 
responsibility towards his creature only a single time in the novel, on his deathbed; but it 
is mentioned only incidentally, more by way of justifying his decision not to create a 
mate for his creature and his desire to destroy him, than as an acknowledgement of his 
failure towards him, which he never truly admits: 
…I feel justified in desiring the death of my adversary.  During these last 
days I have been occupied in examining my past conduct; nor do I find it 
blamable.  In a fit of enthusiastic madness I created a rational creature, and 
was bound towards him, to assure, as far as was in my power, his 
happiness and well-being.  This was my duty; but there was another still 
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paramount to that.  My duties towards the beings of my own species had 
greater claims to my attention….(184) 
 
From the perspective of action, Frankenstein’s reasoning makes a certain sense at this 
point in the story, for the monster has murdered innocent people, and it is reasonable that 
Frankenstein should perceive the need to destroy the bane he created.  What Frankenstein 
is not acknowledging is that the monster’s murders were committed out of revenge on 
himself; it does not enter into his considerations that, upon his own death, the monster’s 
motives for murder might be extinguished as well.   But in any case, falling short of 
assuming responsibility for his failings towards his creature, in the only instance of 
acknowledging responsibility towards him at all, recalls Frankenstein's self-centered 
motives in creating him—“...more, far more, will I achieve:  I will...unfold the deepest 
mysteries of creation” (53)—and suggests an explanation for his insensibility towards 
him.  Frankenstein’s ambitions for glory having been directed towards the world; in their 
disappointment he is blind to his failure towards the initial (and for a considerable time 
the only) victim of it:  his creation.  His failed ambitions continue to direct the vision of 
his failure, narcissistically magnifying some aspects of it and blinding him to others.  To 
draw an analogy with the myth of Narcissus, in equating his creature with his 
ambitions—as Narcissus equated Echo’s voice with his own words—Frankenstein could 
have no feeling for him when those ambitions were disappointed—as Narcissus in his 
disappointment could also show no feeling for Echo.  Like Echo, Frankenstein’s creature 
is a “real” other who becomes the “non-other” in the narcissistic equation.  Unfortunately 
for Frankenstein and the monster’s other victims—unlike Echo who pines away, 
diminishes and finally vanishes upon being scorned by Narcissus—the monster refuses to 
go away.  
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It is a fascinating aspect of the novel that the monster knows best how to punish 
Frankenstein because of the misery he has endured himself.  He does not inflict violence 
upon his creator himself, but upon those whom he loves, thus inflicting the same 
desolation upon Frankenstein that he has suffered himself.  Still Frankenstein’s 
demonization and revilement of his creature, as well as his determination to destroy him, 
are not a real acknowledgement of him as a being in his own right.  For Frankenstein, his 
creature remains always only the demonic creation he brought into the world, for which 
he can only atone through its destruction.  One of the most artful accomplishments of the 
novel is that the author creates a full-fledged character in the monster, but withholds that 
full characterization in Frankenstein’s view of him—even while nearly all of the 
monster’s own words and story are contained within Frankenstein’s own. Rosencrantz- 
and Guildenstern-like, Frankenstein conveys a message of which he remains incognizant, 
and likewise to his own detriment. 
If the monster is the “real other” of the story, it is also true that, as in the story of 
Narcissus, the real other has been traded in for a false one—the idealized image.  On first 
blush, what seems to distinguish Frankenstein’s story from the story of Narcissus is that 
Frankenstein is not only disappointed in his desires, but also disillusioned.  Narcissus 
pines away for a “self” that he still believes to exist but that he may not have; but 
Frankenstein must face the cold hard truth of his false ambitions and his failure, and 
endure the punishment for them.  But it is actually among the most well-wrought ironies 
of the novel that for all of Frankenstein’s torment and crushing disillusionment, which he 
expresses in the most sublime terms, it is not essentially his illusion that has been 
shattered; or at least, inasmuch as it is a shattered ideal that he laments, the shards are not 
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swept away and replaced by something more truthful.  In some sense, the self-
idealization that has driven him remains intact, only now the ideal is split between 
unrealized dream and hellish outcome.   This is suggested in the still vaunting tone of 
Frankenstein’s words as he speaks of his own downfall to Walton:  “‘I was imbued with 
high hopes and a lofty ambition; but how am I sunk!  Oh! My friend, if you had known 
me as I once was, you would not recognize me in this state of degradation…a high 
destiny seemed to bear me on, until I fell, never, never again to rise’” (180).    The sort of 
grandiose self-characterization of these words suggests that Frankenstein views his ruin 
from much the same perspective as that of his earlier ambitions:  with a sort of posturing 
self-awareness, now of a fallen hero.  He feels the greatness of his own fall, as he earlier 
saw the greatness of his potential, from the same heroic perspective.  Even as he warns 
Walton to “seek happiness in tranquility and avoid ambition” (185), Frankenstein seems 
himself never to have wholly abandoned the heroic ethic.  
In this regard he is similar to that greatest of narcissists in Paradise Lost, Satan, 
who also speaks of his own downfall in grandiose terms: 
“Is this the region, this the soil, the clime,” 
Said then the lost Archangel, “this the seat 
That we must change for heav’n, this mournful gloom 
For that celestial light?  Be it so,… 
 
  “…Farewell, happy fields, 
Where joy for ever dwells!  Hail, horrors, hail, 
Infernal World, and thou, profoundest hell, 
Receive thy new possessor:… “ (Milton Bk. I, ll.  242-52) 
 
Resonances of Milton’s Satan are felt in Frankenstein’s words throughout the novel, in 
the narrations of his ambitions and of his downfall.  In the same speech quoted above, 
Frankenstein compares himself to the archfiend:  “All my speculations and hopes are as 
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nothing; and, like the archangel who aspired to omnipotence, I am chained in an eternal 
hell” (Shelley 180).  Frankenstein’s self-comparison with Satan echoes the monster’s 
own earlier in the novel:  “Many times I considered Satan as the fitter emblem of my 
condition; for often, like him...the bitter gall of envy rose within me...I, like the arch-
fiend bore a hell within me...” (117, 122).  Of the parallel between Frankenstein's creature 
and Milton's Satan more will be said later; for present purposes it suffices to observe that 
in the monster’s words the self-comparison does not have the same self-dramatizing 
effect as in his maker's.  This is not to suggest that such utterances of Frankenstein’s are 
not meant to convey genuine and intense suffering, which they certainly are; but they also 
point to a certain self-conscious element, which along with other elements suggest a 
basically narcissistic orientation.  As often seems to be the case with narcissistic self-
awareness, it draws in his audience as well, as Walton’s reaction to him suggests:  “What 
a glorious creature must he have been in the days of his prosperity, when he is thus noble 
and godlike in ruin!” (179) Walton, in his captivation with Frankenstein, becomes a kind 
of mirror for Frankenstein’s self-image. 
 In the transition from ambition to ruin, Frankenstein has not achieved some sort 
of tragic enlightenment, but rather has traded one delusion for another, though both are of 
the same source.  Neither delusion is complete infatuation:  on the fictional terms the 
novel presents us, Frankenstein is right in supposing he was capable of a breakthrough no 
other had accomplished; and in his downfall, he realizes too well the terrible work he has 
accomplished and the excesses that drove him to it.  But in both he is blind to himself, as 
was Narcissus both in his proud scornfulness and in his self-pining.  Thematically this 
split between dream and disillusionment in Frankenstein is analogous to Narcissus’ desire 
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and unfulfillment:  in the perfect world, Narcissus could possess his love, and 
Frankenstein could have had with impunity the success and glory due a great scientist.  
But the real split lies elsewhere, in the division separating the idealized self from the real 
self that, in the case of both Narcissus and Frankenstein, demonstrates an unfeeling 
disregard for others.  This is true of Frankenstein both before and after his fall.  His 
ambitions couch themselves in terms of the welfare of humankind—“unfold[ing] to the 
world the deepest mysteries of creation” (53)—when they are really directed toward self-
aggrandizement; and in his pursuit of the monster, whom he now believes he must 
destroy for the protection of humanity—“my duties towards the beings of my own 
species” (184)—he is willing to sacrifice Walton and the entire ship’s crew to his 
purpose.  To this end he addresses the crew in vainglorious rhetoric which, as like 
thinking has done to himself, alternately inspires and plunges them into despair, as 
Walton relates in his letters to his sister: 
Even the sailors feel the power of his eloquence:  when he speaks, they no 
longer despair; he rouses their energies, and, while they hear his voice, 
they believe these vast mountains of ice are mole-hills, which will vanish 
before the resolutions of man.  These feelings are transitory; each day of 
expectation delayed fills them with fear, and I almost dread a mutiny 
caused by this despair. (181) 
 
As is also typical of narcissistic personalities, Frankenstein draws others into his 
purposes, makes them an extension of his.  Shelley almost comically inflates the heroic 
rhetoric Frankenstein employs to manipulate Walton’s crew: 
Oh! be men, or be more than men.  Be steady to your purposes, and firm 
as a rock.  This ice is not made of such stuff as your hearts may be; it is 
mutable, and cannot withstand you, if you say that it shall not.  Do not 
return to your families with the stigma of disgrace marked on your brows.  
Return as heroes who have fought and conquered, and who know not what 




Such passages as these are another thematic link with Milton’s Satan; they recall the 
archdemon’s address to the legions of hell as he likewise goads them to futile valor in the 
service of his own despairing purpose: 
For who can yet believe, though after loss, 
That all these puissant legions, whose exile 
Hath emptied heav’n, shall fail to re-ascend 
Self-raised, and repossess their native seat?... 
For this infernal pit shall never hold 
Celestial Spirits in bondage,…/…Peace is despaired, 
For who can think submission?  War then, war 
Open or understood must be resolved. (Milton I, ll.  631-34, 657-62) 
 
In calling attention to these overtones of Milton’s antihero in her discussion of Miltonic 
allusion in Frankenstein, Leslie Tannenbaum points out the irony that although 
Frankenstein warns Walton of the crafty eloquence of the monster that he must guard 
against (Shelley 178), it is actually he who uses eloquence selfishly and deceitfully in 
trying to persuade the sailors on Walton’s ship not to turn back.22  This observation lends 
support to the argument that in his hopeless crusade against the monster, Frankenstein is 
still driven by an inflated sense of self that, in the failure of the earlier designs in which 
he had invested it, he idealizes at the expense of his alter-ego, heaping his own failings on 
his creature and enemy. 
 Parallels between the monster and Satan have been mentioned earlier, and are also 
very pronounced in the novel.  Having learned to read by happening upon a copy of 
(conspicuously) Paradise Lost, the monster identifies with both Adam and Satan, as he 
says in addressing his creator Frankenstein:  “Remember, that I am thy creature; I ought 
to be thy Adam; but I am rather the fallen angel, whom thou drivest from joy for no 
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misdeed” (93-94).  The sense of his outcast state is more powerful than his wonder at his 
own creation, and it is Satan with whom he most closely identifies and compares himself:  
“Many times I considered Satan as the fitter emblem of my condition; for often, like 
him…the bitter gall of envy rose within me…I, like the arch-fiend, bore a hell within 
me…” (117,122).  The creature’s words to his maker pinpoint the main difference 
between their identifications with Satan:  diagetically, the creature has done nothing to 
bring his outcast state upon himself; it was brought upon him solely by his maker.   
As the monster rightly accuses him, in having turned his back upon him, 
Frankenstein has cast him out at a point when monster is still innocent of evil; and 
Frankenstein is also the cause the monster’s ugliness, which has made it impossible for 
him to find acceptance elsewhere:  
Like Adam, I was apparently united by no link to any other being in 
existence; but his state was far different from mine in every other respect.  
He had come forth from the hands of God a perfect creature, happy and 
prosperous, guarded by the especial care of his Creator; he was allowed to 
converse with, and acquire knowledge from beings of a superior nature:  
but I was wretched, helpless and alone. (116) 
 
 Ultimately, in driving him to despair, Frankenstein is the author of the monster’s 
corruption itself—his fall from innocence analogous to Adam and Eve’s fall from grace.  
This is yet another point in which Frankenstein has failed in his usurped role of creator; 
for the Creator of Paradise Lost made his creatures free to choose, to keep their blessed 
state or to fall. 
…they themselves decreed 
Their own revolt, not I. … 
They trespass, authors to themselves in all, 
Both what they judge and what they choose; for so 
I formed them free, and free they must remain, 




The complex shifting of parallels with Miltonic figures in Frankenstein portrays 
Shelley’s tragic hero as a parody of the Miltonic God whose failure as a creator on every 
level shifts him into the position of Satan, as he has shifted his own creature as well from 
the role of Adam to that of Satan.   
All of this casts further light on the monster’s other parallel role discussed earlier, 
the parallel with Eve in her innocent self-discovery and self-infatuation.  The monster 
himself has pointed out the most important difference between himself and Adam in 
terms of his relationship to the world in which he finds himself:  he is “wretched, helpless 
and alone.”  This difference is equally important in the parallel with Eve, in light of what 
follows upon her self-discovery and self-enamorment in Paradise Lost.  In her narration 
of this, Eve continues: 
…there I had fixed / Mine eyes till now, and pined with vain desire, 
Had not a voice thus warned me: “What thou seest, 
What there thou seest, fair creature, is thyself, 
With thee it came and goes; but follow me, 
And I will bring thee where no shadow stays 
Thy coming, and thy soft embraces, he 
Whose image thou art, him thou shalt enjoy 
Inseparably thine;”… (Milton IV, ll.  465-73) 
 
A charmingly humorous touch to the story is that Eve is not quite as taken with Adam as 
with the image she has just left behind, and is about to return to it when Adam beckons 
her and overcomes her narcissistic longing—a little forcibly, it seems:  “With that thy 
gentle hand/ Seized mine, I yielded,…” (ll.  488-89).  There are many fascinating aspects 
of this narration that could be pursued; what primarily concerns us here is the contrast 
with the monster’s parallel experience of self-discovery.  It is not the prelude to the 
introduction to love for another, but marks the moment when the inevitability of the 
monster’s isolation first dawns upon him, even if he does not yet “entirely know the fatal 
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effects of this miserable deformity” (Shelley 104).  His own image is no consolation for 
his isolation, as Eve’s own image was a temptation for her; it is self-horror, the 
consequence of the hideousness with which his creator endowed him—the same flawed 
workmanship that, in an instant, dashed Frankenstein’s hopes and turned his ambitions to 
revulsion:  “Mingled with this horror, I felt the bitterness of disappointment; dreams that 
had been my food and pleasant rest for so long a space were now become a hell to me; 
and the change was so rapid, the overthrow so complete!” (61)  At the moment he brings 
his creation to life, it is largely Frankenstein’s vanity that is disappointed and offended; 
for as we have already seen, in the designs of his imagination that inspired his 
undertaking and fed his obsession, he had seen his own glory and fame reflected.  What 
the monster beholds at a point when he is still innocent of evil is the failure and 
culpability of his creator.  What Eve’s narration seems to suggest is that narcissism, at 
least the tendency towards it, is something essentially innocent in itself, perhaps even the 
basis of love of an other and of the proper relationship of oneself to the world—though it 
may always threaten to supplant these with illusion.  The monster is cheated of all of 
these—of Eve’s pre-lapsarian pleasure of self-discovery, of love and companionship that 
he must demand for himself, of a relationship with his world—by his creator, of whom 
Narcissus is a type.  His miserable isolation is a negative type of the desolation of 
narcissistic self-idealization; but his is forced upon him, unlike Frankenstein’s, who 
chooses it when he fatally crosses that threshold into illusion and sees in his own image 
something that is not there:  a legitimate creator—as Narcissus saw in his own image 
something it was not:  an other who could be adored.  And as in that story the real other 
vanishes but remains, invisible in the woods, rendered as unsubstantial by Narcissus’ 
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cruelty as the object of his passion, so the real other in the novel, whom Frankenstein 
cheated of all, remains for him nothing but the shadow side of his own disappointed 
illusions.  This he vainly pursues into the icy wasteland in the conviction that destroying 
him will rectify all.  Without the specifically theological implications of Milton’s epic, in 
the elaborate parallels with Satan Shelley portrays the self-inflation and futility of 
narcissistic self-idealization as something empty and despairing—perhaps ultimately as 
the spirit’s exile into a hopeless wasteland, whether or not this bears any relationship to 
the hell of Milton’s cosmos. 
On its most overt level, the presence of the narcissistic theme in Frankenstein 
seems to be a critique of overweening scientific arrogance:  the blind pursuit of scientific 
accomplishment lacking all reverence for nature and ignoring all moral boundaries.  One 
of the things Shelley accomplishes in the elaborate incorporation of Miltonic allusions in 
the novel is to portray the scientific usurpation of the role traditionally ascribed to God, 
by human beings blinded by ambition and lacking the foresight and benevolence 
attributed to God.   The presence of Walton in the story, who takes in Frankenstein in the 
Arctic and whose determination to reach the North Pole parallels Frankenstein's 
ambitions, extends the critique beyond scientism to a wider range of human endeavor, but 
the same indictment of hubris applies.  Ultimately, through an elaborate reworking of the 
Narcissus myth, through the allusion to Eve and especially through Frankenstein’s 
relationship to his abortive self-reflection, the author is critiquing something more 
fundamental about human nature.  The Narcissus myth is a “self-reflexive” allusion in the 
novel, reflecting through the monster to other literary works, back onto his creator and 
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perhaps back onto us the readers.  For the myth reflects something fundamental about its 
tragic protagonist, and through him about tragic humanity.   
  In this way Shelley incorporates a philosophical or spiritual, even a  kind of 
religious perspective into her novel: a sense of the proper relationship to others, to nature 
and the world, and the (potentially catastrophic) consequences that follow when that 
sense of proper relationship is violated.  Because Shelley uses the subversion of 
traditional religious themes to portray that violation, her novel has been interpreted as the 
subversion of the religious themes themselves.  We have already encountered a few such 
interpretations, in Gilbert's and Lamb's analyses of parallels with Paradise Lost.  Soyka 
gives another such view, though more general, in his assertion that Victor Frankenstein is 
emblematic of the thoughtless Creator who has abandoned his creation and has himself 
laid the groundwork for human wickedness.   Soyka interprets Shelley’s novel as an 
indictment of careless divinity, concluding that if redemption is possible, it must come 
through mankind, and not through God.23  
  Although this is one possible interpretation, the present study posits a less 
fundamentally subversive treatment of religious themes in the novel.  Shelley's 
subversive treatment of Milton contains a critique of her own age:  the portrayal of a 
world in which a loss of the faith that had directed the sense of the ultimate towards an 
ultimate “Other”—and through that Other to others—has left a void that has been filled 
with a narcissistic self-image.  Through the use of the Narcissus theme to portray a 
worldview that is essentially narcissistic and blind to itself, Shelley seems to reach 
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through Milton’s use of the same theme to something more universal.  Most significant 
for present purposes is the observation that the treatment of this theme, in the various 
cultural frameworks through which we have so far traced it, has had a certain consistency 
in terms of its cultural, moral and philosophical implications for humanity.  The reversal 
of this orientation towards the narcissistic thematic in the philosophy of Friedrich 










NIETZSCHE’S ZUR GENEALOGIE DER MORAL 
 
 
 A few problems with comparing and contrasting Nietzsche to the earlier literary 
writers should be acknowledged at the outset.  Perhaps the most obvious is the question 
of genre:  whether it is appropriate or even possible to compare the literary treatment of 
an essentially literary theme with the appearance of the same theme in a philosophical 
work.  A second issue, related to the first though not obviously, is that unlike the literary 
authors, Nietzsche makes no specific or even apparently conscious allusion to the myth of 
Narcissus.  The first objection might well be valid if we were to make a cross-genre 
comparison between literary allusion to the Narcissus story and, for example, Freud’s 
application of it.  Freud used the terms “narcissism” and “narcissistic” to refer to definite, 
observed psychological phenomena, which he might have felt to be reflected in the myth 
of Narcissus; but such technical definition places a boundary around the theme that does 
not constrain literary allusion.  An analysis of narcissism in Freud in the context of this 
discussion would have to take this limitation into account; but the same is not necessarily 
true of Nietzsche, who does not incorporate narcissism or the Narcissus theme into his 
philosophy in any explicit way, and thus does not attach any specific meaning to it that 
would limit analysis to those terms.  It is arguable that Nietzsche does not incorporate the 
Narcissus theme at all; but I would argue that it is embodied in his philosophy in a way 
that has striking parallels with its development in the works of the literary authors—in 
  
50
fact, that it is as profoundly present in his philosophy as it is in Milton’s epic or Shelley’s 
novel.  Nevertheless, it cannot be discussed in exactly the same way as in those works 
where the theme is built into the structure of the works themselves (in spite of never 
being specifically mentioned).  Examining the narcissistic theme in Nietzsche’s writings 
is admittedly a bit more like examining it in the characters of those works than the use the 
authors were making of it.  This comparison is the more apt for the fact that the quality of 
Nietzsche’s speech is not altogether different from that of Victor Frankenstein's or of 
Satan's in Paradise Lost, in several of their speeches already quoted for example; and its 
rhetorical intent and appeal are highly comparable. These similarities would still exist 
even if Milton’s and Shelley’s works had never suggested Narcissus explicitly; thus the 
issue of explicitness of the theme itself should not necessarily be a deterring factor in an 
analysis such as this—especially as Nietzsche in his own way does thematize narcissism, 
overtly if not explicitly.    
 In the case of genre, a consideration in favor of the comparison is the literary 
quality of Nietzsche’s writing.  His impassioned, subjective philosophical approach and  
the rhetorical flourish characteristic of his style contribute to a quality whose persuasive 
power is distinct from the more usual methodical appeal to reason typical of philosophy, 
and provides inroads of comparison with literary works. The most significant difference 
in the presence of the Narcissus theme in Nietzsche’s philosophy from its use in the 
works already discussed lies not in differences of genre or explicitness of allusion, but in 
orientation towards the theme itself; and as this difference of orientation, on account of 
its profound influence, has enormous implications for subsequent intellectual, literary and 
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cultural development, it is an apt subject of comparison for the purposes of this study, 
even as care must be taken to observe factors problematizing the comparison.  
 Another issue that ought to be addressed upfront is the question of philosophical 
voice.  Considerable attention has been focused on understanding the voice (or voices) 
behind Nietzsche's philosophy, especially as this sometimes seems in conflict with what 
is known about the philosopher himself.  This is especially true with regard to Nietzsche's 
ideas about compassion, which figure importantly in this study for reasons which should 
be clear from the subsequent analysis.  Compassion is almost always presented in a 
negative light in Zur Genealogie der Moral, in spite of correspondences and accounts of 
Nietzsche that represent the philosopher himself as compassionate.  Michael Frazer, in 
his analysis of compassion in Nietzsche's philosophy, presents a more complex view of 
the philosopher's ideas about compassion than is evident in this work alone.  However, 
Frazer's study does not lend much support to the idea that Nietzsche was writing 
ironically or deceptively in the view he presents of compassion in Zur Genealogie der 
Moral24 and it is also known that Nietzsche considered his own type and degree of 
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 Another viewpoint to consider is the possibility that Nietzsche is presenting an 
alternative to the predominant morality of his age in order to unsettle that morality and 
show it to be only one ethic among many possibilities.  Such an interpretation must 
assume a high level of irony or role-playing on Nietzsche's part.  To whatever extent this 
might be the case, Nietzsche would then be presenting a voice that is not his own, but is 
to a high degree fictitious.  This would of course be of consequence for the larger 
understanding of Nietzsche's philosophy but would not substantially change this analysis, 
where the ultimate perspective behind the work is not as relevant as the point of view 
being conveyed, and the way in which narcissism is reflected through that point of view.  
Whatever the ultimate perspective of the work may be—which appears to be not 
absolutely determinable—this study will mostly limit itself to an analysis of the voice 
Nietzsche presents; and where it speculates beyond that to larger observations and 
conclusions, the uncertainty of the philosophical voice is acknowledged.  At the very 
least, Nietzsche’s work gives no solid reason to suppose that the narcissism reflected in 
its manner of expression is being portrayed critically, as is clear in Shelley.  
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compassion an affliction and weakness that fought against his own philosophical ideals.25    
Although the issue of philosophical voice in Nietzsche's work is fraught with complexity, 
there is a higher degree of immediacy of that voice in Zur Genealogie der Moral than, for 
example, in Also sprach Zarathustra, in which it can be taken even less for granted that 
the voice of Zarathustra is equivalent to Nietzsche's.  For this reason and for the sake of 
simplicity, “Nietzsche” and “the philosophical voice” will be used interchangeably in this 
study, with the understanding that such an equation of identity is not unproblematic.   
 Peter Burgard adds another layer of complexity to issue of voice that should also 
be considered.  In his discussion of the feminine in Nietzsche, referring to the 
philosopher's remarks about women Burgard asserts that “Nietzsche is the philosopher of 
excess.  Everywhere we turn, we are faced with excess both in form and in content.”26  
Burgard refers to Alexander Nehemas, who has pointed out Nietzsche's “rhetorical 
excess,” claiming that Nietzsche's texts “often say too much” with respect to the content 
of those texts.  Nehemas considers this quality to be an essential aspect of Nietzsche's 
philosophy:  “Nietzsche's writing, and his thinking, is essentially hyperbolic.”27 This 
might be further supported by Nietzsche’s own designation of the work as a “eine 
Streitschrift,”  (“a polemic”), since hyperbole and otherwise immoderate expression is in 
the spirit of polemic language.  Though undoubtedly an important consideration to keep 
in mind in understanding Nietzsche's philosophy, it is somewhat problematic in terms of 
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critiquing any of the philosopher's statements, for anything can potentially be regarded as 
excessive or hyperbolic.  Presumably excess and hyperbole imply some lesser expression 
being conveyed; and as the philosopher has given no guide by which to determine this, he 
consequently cannot be considered responsible for having said anything.  In any case it is 
not primarily the extremity of Nietzsche's statements that is being examined here (though 
this is also sometimes significant) but the quality of what he is saying; usually paring 
down Nietzsche's expressions to whatever one might consider a correct interpretation for 
them (within reason) would not severely affect this analysis.       
 What makes the difference of orientation between Mary Shelley and Nietzsche 
perhaps the most striking is their historical proximity.  Within less than a century of each 
other, Shelley’s and Nietzsche’s approaches to the subject of narcissism are arguably 
more distant than the nearly two millennia separating Shelley and Ovid—and most 
certainly than the nearly two centuries between Shelley and Milton.  The objection might 
be raised that there is nothing monolithic about literary themes:  any writer or artist of 
any kind or in any century might have taken any approach they liked to the theme.  This 
may be true, but the differences examined in this study are both intimately linked with 
cultural and historical developments—some already reflected in Shelley’s novel—and 
something new in literary and  intellectual history; in part they are Nietzsche’s peculiar 
innovation, and perhaps one of his lasting contributions. 
 In part, Shelley and Nietzsche are both responding to the growing secularization 
of European society, to the ensuing cultural, scientific and intellectual changes and the 
existential angst left in its wake.  It has sometimes been said that Frankenstein represents 
a world from which God has vanished (Soyka 167); less than a century later Nietzsche 
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declares God to be dead.28  It could be said that as the immanence of God retreats with 
this increasing secularization, in the face of the expanding existential emptiness left 
behind by it a growing need for self-creation is felt, and already thematically reflected in 
Frankenstein.  Perhaps what has so far in this study been called “narcissism”—the 
infatuation with an “idealized self-image” that in Frankenstein is shattered and becomes 
the object of revulsion and despair—is merely a reflection of a movement in the direction 
of self-creation, but over which God still hovers like a bad conscience.  Perhaps this bad 
conscience is finally dispelled with Nietzsche, who heralds its dissipation once and for all 
and is free to embrace self-creation in a new way—which thus seems radically opposite 
from Shelley’s and her predecessors’.  If “God is dead,” then inasmuch as one’s sense of 
self derives from God and has its meaning through that divine attribution, it must be 
viewed as the falsehood that it is, destroyed and replaced with something viable; the 
individual must assume the role of God for him- or herself.  The shadow of foreboding 
and impending disaster that still seems to loom over the theme of self-creation in 
Frankenstein, negatively projected as narcissism, would finally dispel; for self-creation 
would then be viewed not only as positive but as a necessity.  This may be the reason 
Nietzsche never evokes Narcissus explicitly; for Narcissus would be the figure of 
entrapment in a relationship with the self that, properly regarded, would really be a 
liberation from strictures that had defined the self, spectrally.  Self-adoration may be the 
normal, healthy response for the superior being Nietzsche portrays, who no longer needs 
some transcendent phantom—the real “shadow without substance”—before whom this 
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self must cringe in self-abnegation if it wants the benefit of the residual significance 
emanating from that being.  Even this old definition of the “self” must be discarded, for it 
belongs to a past of superstitious awe:  it shared in the illusion of the divine and fed off of 
it.  Perhaps the real “split in the self” identified in Frankenstein is not between the 
idealized and the “real” self, but between the modern enlightened scientist and the 
transcendental somnambulant who had not yet quite awakened from an illusory past. 
 Whether the evocation of the Narcissus figure is an apt one or not, it is in any case 
surprising, as was also true of both Milton and Shelley, that so little has been written 
about narcissism in Nietzsche's writings.  The fact alone that his “autobiography,” Ecce 
Homo, consists of chapters bearing titles such as “Why I Am So Wise,” “Why I am so 
Clever” and “Why I Write Such Good Books,”29 might have at least merited passing 
comparisons.  It is of course true that self-vaunting and self-enchantment are not 
necessarily equivalent; yet the little writing that has been done on the subject suggests the 
impression that it is not this sort of fine distinction but some general immunity from the 
association surrounding the philosopher that has inhibited the comparison, in spite of (or 
even by virtue of) a manner of self-expression that would seem to invite it.  Altieri, one 
of the few scholars who has written directly on the subject of narcissism in Nietzsche, 
argues rather elaborately that a “highly self-conscious dimension” and the flouting of 
autobiographical convention in Ecce Homo raises such expressions above the level of 
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narcissism.30  Whatever complexities may underlie the tone of Nietzsche’s vaunting self-
characterization in Ecce Homo, this section will focus instead on the less obviously self-
conscious expression of  narcissism in Zur Genealogie der Moral—expression which, 
while less overt than in Nietzsche's obviously self-referential writing, is more 
foundational to his philosophy.  
 In the literary works alluding to the Narcissus story already discussed, it was 
possible to focus on moments in the narration which contained a clear allusion to the 
myth (or to a reference to it), and from there to draw into the discussion other passages 
and narrative elements elaborating the theme.  This is of course not true of Nietzsche’s 
works for reasons already pointed out; however it is possible to begin an analysis with a 
passage in which the theme is most clearly pronounced.  Such a passage occurs in the 
midst of Nietzsche’s discussion of the “Herrschermoral” (“master ethic,” more usually 
referred to as the “vornehme Whertungsweise,”31) and his contrast of this with the 
“Sklavenmoral” (“slave ethic,” also often called the “Ressentiment”32).  The Herrscher-
/Sklavenmoral dichotomy pervades Nietzsche’s exposition of the origins of morality, the 
history of which he felt explained the current moral morass into which he considered 
European society to have sunk as a result of the usurped ascendency of the Sklavenmoral.  
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Eschewing any pretense of objectivity—always a pretense in Nietzsche's view—the 
philosopher expresses contempt, even hatred for the “Menschen des Ressentiment,” 
portraying them as poisonous and hypocritical moralists, hate-driven weaklings who 
through some inexplicably successful insurrection have gained the upper hand over their 
superiors in the eternal struggle for power.  These “Menschen des Ressentiment” cling to 
the Sklavenmoral to protect themselves and to maintain their power, defining themselves 
as “die Guten” on the criteria of the slave morality, and more importantly, by contrast 
with those whom they have branded as “die Bösen”:  those of the “vornehme 
Werthungsweise”—the strong, powerful, free, high-spiritedly cruel, healthy ones of the 
world.  In this passage, these noble ones are portrayed as reveling in themselves, for they 
have no need of reference or comparison to any other.   
Das Umgekehrte ist bei der vornehmen Werthungsweise der Fall:  sie agirt 
und wächst spontan, sie sucht ihren Gegensatz nur auf, um zu sich selber 
noch dankbarer, noch frohlockender Ja zu sagen—ihr negativer Begriff 
“niedrig” “gemein” “schlecht” ist nur ein nachgebornes blasses 
Contrastbild im Verhältnis zu ihrem positiven, durch und durch mit Leben 
und Leidenschaft durchtränkten Grundbegriff “wir Vornehmen, wir 
Guten, wir Schönen, wir Glücklichen!“ (ZGM 26-27) 
 
The opposite is true of the aristocratic valuations:  such values grow and 
act spontaneously, seeking out their contraries only in order to affirm 
themselves even more gratefully and delightedly.  Here the negative 
concepts, humble [low], base, bad, are late, pallid counterparts of the 
positive, intense and passionate credo, „We noble, good, beautiful, happy 
ones.“ (GM 171)33 
 
This passage is key in the characterization of Nietzsche's ideal:  the “noble” ones are 
imbued with real virtues, unlike the specular ones fashioned through contrast with them 
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and ascribed to themselves by the weak—”die Ohnmächtigen” or “faint-hearted” ones, as 
Nietzsche often refers to them (ZGM 29 and elsewhere)–for the purposes of  maintaining 
their power.  There is something strangely essentialist—considering Nietzsche's anti-
essentialist stance, of which more will be said later—not only in Nietzsche's 
conceptualization of the “noble” ones of the world and their “real” virtues,34 but also in 
the sense that power is theirs by right and not by false design, as with those of the 
“Sklavenmoral.”  A certain blessedness hovers around Nietzsche's “noble” ones:  a 
sublime quality that seems to borrow from both heroic mythology and from Christian 
notions of saintliness (or rather, perhaps, from original innocence)—though it is also 
clearly conceived as the antithesis of the latter.  Christian-like virtues and their antithesis 
are both present in the two faces of the “noble” ones,  for whom Nietzsche reclaims the 
designation of “good”: 
wer jene “Guten” nur als Feinde kennen lernte, lernte auch nichts als böse 
Feinde kennen, und dieselben Menschen, welche so streng durch Sitte, 
Verehrung, Brauch, Dankbarkeit,...[und] die...im Verhalten zu einander so 
erfinderisch in Rücksicht, Selbstbeherrshung, Zartsinn, Treue, Stolz und 
Freundschaft sich beweisen,—sie sind nach Aussen hin, dort wo das 
Fremde, die Fremde beginnt, nicht viel besser als losgelassne 
Raubthiere...sie treten in die Unschuld des Raubthier-Gewissens zurück, 
als frohlockende Ungeheuer...(30) 
  
anyone who knew these “good ones” only as enemies would find them 
evil enemies indeed.  For these same men who, amongst themselves, are 
so strictly constrained by custom, worship, ritual, gratitude,...who are so 
resourceful in consideration, [self-control,] tenderness, loyalty, pride and 
friendship, when once they step out of their circle become little better than 
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uncaged beasts of prey...They revert to the innocence of wild animals 
[exultant monsters]... (GM 174) 
 
The division of identities here might begin to sound familiar at this point, for it is 
strongly suggestive of the same split we have already encountered—the self-idealizing 
split that always seeks to have it both ways.  In the real world, the existence of virtues 
such as Nietzsche enumerates, in those who—as Nietzsche goes on to imagine his 
“noble” ones doing—indulge in “Mord, Niederbrennung, Schändung, Folterung mit 
einem Übermuthe und seelischen Gleichgewichte” (ZGM 30) (“murder, arson, rape, and 
torture, jubilant and at peace with themselves [in good cheer and equanimity of spirit]”) 
(GM 174), is at best evidence of an appalling ability to compartmentalize; those who 
commit such acts are not considered (by non-Nietzscheans) the less monstrous—perhaps 
rather more—for the virtues they selectively practice among themselves and their own.  
In Nietzsche's philosophy, such flexibility of moral behavior instead depends on a new 
conception of “innocence”—another term he reclaims by applying his own definition. 
Nietzsche's concept of “zweite Unschuld” (“second innocence”) is both of central 
importance to the new morality he calls for, and has deep theological resonances:  an 
underlying sense that Nietzsche's noble “Raubthier” is worthy of reclaiming dominion 
over the Paradise from which he has been driven depends upon it.  Although we will 
return to this idea of “second innocence” at a later point, it is worth pointing out here the 
striking analogy between this concept and Narcissus' reflection.  As we recall in the 
analysis of that story, this was a “negative” reflection of Narcissus in the sense that it 
negated what was ugly in himself, and like a photographic negative, even reflected an 
opposite image of this aspect of him.  Likewise “second innocence” (in German 
“Unschuld,” or “un-guilt”) is both a negative virtue (or can be viewed as such) and 
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essentially the opposite of the freedom from conscience even upon engaging in the sorts 
of crimes Nietzsche imagines his noble ones committing.  The idea of “second 
innocence”  is also an example of points at which Nietzsche “borrows back” from the 
values he repudiates, to lend to the figure he creates a dignifying and redeeming 
dimension. 
 In spite of the well-conceptualized, fleshed-out image he creates, it is also 
fascinating that Nietzsche seems to be talking entirely in the abstract:  no one in 
particular seems to exemplify these virtues whose vividness leaves them in no need of an 
antithesis by which to define themselves.35 It is clearly an ideal that Nietzsche is putting 
forward here36—one seemingly more real for its lack of reference to anything outside 
itself.  Never in Zur Genealogie der Moral does Nietzsche offer a model for his noble 
“Raubthier,” even though it looms over his work like the displaced hero whose time has 
come.  Specific figures whom Nietzsche mentions as having in some way embodied this 
ideal—such as Napoleon or Wagner—are presented as fallen examples of this ideal, or 
are part of a more romantic past. 
Perhaps even more to the purpose of this analysis in this passage is the kind of 
ecstatic self-appreciation in which Nietzsche imagines his ideal type.  Nietzsche's 
depiction of them as somehow singing their own virtues to themselves might simply be a 
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literary way of presenting the virtues themselves; but it is clear that a kind of self-
exultation is part of their blessed state.  It is interesting to note the emphasis Nietzsche 
lays upon self-sufficiency:  contrast with inferior beings might be a pale enhancement to 
the blissful self-regard of the noble ones, but is far from being necessary to it.  Also 
interesting, in contrast to every other instance of narcissistic rapture we have 
encountered, there is no unsatisfied longing in the self-enjoyment Nietzsche imputes to 
the noble “Raubthier;” it is a kind of narcissism in fulfillment.  At the same time, without 
this contrast with a type of people to whom the noble “Raubthier” is being compared, 
such self-appreciation might seem a bit absurd.  The lack of need for any reference 
beyond itself is essential to the ideal being projected—for if the self-concept of the noble 
ones depends upon contrast with the weaklings, then they are no better than those they (or 
Nietzsche) despise, who must compare themselves to others for their self-conception—
yet this also leaves such self-appreciation without a basis or context.  Even at the 
rhetorical level, as it occurs here, such self-idealization does not bear scrutiny.  Without 
the contradictions that such an ideal can allow itself it is without substance.  The self-
enchantment of those of the “vornehme Werthungsweise” is as spectral as the literary 
instances so far examined; but Nietzsche portrays it as somehow real, natural and valid, 
notwithstanding a certain semi-mythologized aura with which he surrounds it. 
Idealization characterizes many aspects of Nietzsche's “Raubvogel-Mensch”37  It 
is present in the implication that the noble ones have suffered at the hands of their 
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inferiors through the “Sklavenaufstand” (“Slave insurrection”): “Alles, was auf Erden 
gegen 'die Vornehmen', 'die Gewaltigen', 'die Herren', 'die Machthaber' gethan worden 
ist” (ZGM 22) (“Everything that has been done against the noble ones, the violent, the 
masters, the powerful ones of this earth.”)38   It also characterizes a sort of golden time 
Nietzsche posits in the past, in which this ideal type of human flourished, before shame 
became attached to cruelty: 
Im Gegentheil soll ausdrücklich bezeugt sein, dass damals, als die 
Menschheit sich ihrer Grausamkeit noch nicht schämte, das Leben heiterer 
auf Erden war als jetzt, wo es Pessimisten giebt. (57) 
 
On the contrary, it should be clearly understood that in the days when 
people were unashamed of cruelty, life was a great deal more enjoyable 
than it is now in the heyday of pessimism [when there are pessimists]. 
(GM 199) 
 
Though accurate in sense, “life was a great deal more enjoyable” is considerably more 
prosaic than “das Leben heiterer auf Erden war,” which has more the tone of a 
romanticized origin myth; and the strong suggestion of innocence has particular 
resonances of the Biblical story of Paradise before the knowledge of good and evil.  This 
was humankind's “first innocence,” and the descent from this into moralization and 
shame is described in terms subtly suggestive of the Fall:   
Die Verdüsterung des Himmels über dem Menschen hat immer im 
Verhältnis dazu überhand genommen, als die Scham des Menschen vor 
dem Menschen gewachsen ist...ich meine die krankhafte Verzärtlichung 
und Vermoralisirung, vermöge deren das Gethier “Mensch” sich 
schliesslich aller seiner Instinkte schämen lernt. (VGM 57). 
 
The sky overhead has always grown darker in proportion as man has 
grown ashamed of his fellows [the shame of one person before another has 
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grown]...the bog of morbid finickiness and moralistic drivel which has 
alienated man from his natural instincts. (GM 199)39 
 
  Idealization is also present in the longing Nietzsche expresses for a time when this 
overturned hierarchy will be put right again.  When the gloom of God and the morality 
God represents are finally dispelled, the human animal will be free to follow its instincts, 
and cruelty will no longer be cause for shame.  Nietzsche characterizes atheism as 
humankind's “second innocence,” its first innocence having been the long prehistory in 
which humans could take pleasure in cruelty without the sense that there was anything 
wrong with it: 
Ja die Aussicht ist nicht abzuweisen, dass der vollkommne und endgültige 
Sieg des Atheismus die Menschheit von diesem ganzen Gefühl, Schulden 
gegen ihren Anfang, ihre causa prima zu haben, lösen dürfte.  Atheismus 
und eine Art zweiter Unschuld gehören zu einander. (ZGM 84) 
 
It also stands to reason—doesn't it?—that a complete and definitive 
victory of atheism might deliver mankind altogether from its feeling of 
being indebted to its beginnings, its causa prima.  Atheism and a kind of 
“second innocence” go together. (GM 124) 
 
Again the sort of Biblical tone and associations of this passage lend to the power of its 
declarations; there is a distinctly romantic sense attached to this return to nature that 
verges on religious fervency—though a probably self-conscious sense of irony in the 
associations is also not absent.  Nietzsche's tone may reflect a certain romanticization 
hovering around the still fairly recent clarity over humankind's animal nature; he might 
be excused for reflecting an early stage in the understanding of evolutionary psychology.  
Even so, there are many fascinating aspects about this passage that can be critiqued on 
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translation:  “I mean the sickly enervation and moralizing by virtue of which the human 
animal has learned finally to be ashamed of all its instincts.” 
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the philosopher’s own terms.  First, rather than overthrowing hierarchies altogether, 
which would be consistent with Nietzsche's anti-idealistic stance, he only seems to 
impose a new hierarchy in place of the old:  in positing that that the suffering brought 
about by human cruelty towards one another is somehow superior to the suffering of 
repressed instincts towards cruelty.  The revulsion he expresses in his descriptions of the 
moralistic morass into which he considered society to have sunk unmistakably asserts 
that hierarchy.  Second, the whole question of superiority aside, he does not seem to 
question the assumption that the sort of morality he calls for—which might have been 
possible at least in a sparsely populated world inhabited by marauding tribes—would be 
at all tenable in a modern civilization.  Finally, there seems to be no question that people, 
once having developed a social conscience, could be so easily disabused of it—again the 
whole question of the desirability of such a development aside, or of whether this would 
resemble anything like what is normally called “innocence.”  Nietzsche's assertions about 
the return of a golden age of unencumbered barbarity bespeak a sweeping idealization 
whose compelling quality seems to raise it above the need for evidence, examination or 
consideration of consequence.40 
 Perhaps the greatest irony of the idealism reflected here and elsewhere in Zur 
Genalogie der Moral is how at odds it seems with Nietzsche's status as the anti-idealistic 
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philosopher, as well as the express purpose of his own philosophy as he himself states it, 
for example, in Ecce Homo: 
To overthrow idols (my word for ideals)—that rather is my business.  
Reality has been deprived of its value, its meaning, its veracity to the same 
degree as an ideal world has been fabricated...The lie of the ideal has 
hitherto been the curse on reality.41 
 
Nietzsche mounts a spirited attack on idealism in Zur Genalogie der Moral, devoting an 
entire section of the book to exploring the „fabrication of ideals“—that is until fear of 
suffocation forces him to break off his investigation:  “Ich halte es nicht mehr aus.  
Schlechte Luft!  Schlechte Luft!  Diese Werkstätte, wo man Ideale fabriziert—mich 
dünkt, sie stinkt vor lauter Lügen” (ZGM 38); (“But I've had all I can stand.  The smell is 
too much for me. [Bad air!  Bad air!]  This shop where they manufacture ideals seems to 
me to stink of lies”) (GM 181).  Nietzsche seems to be referring here specifically to the 
“das asketische Ideal,” which is admittedly very different from the sort of ideal he is 
putting forth—arguably the opposite of it.  But this is only true in content and spirit.  
Nietzsche never delineates what he means qualitatively by “idealism” or “ideals,” he only 
describes the “ascetic ideal” itself.  If this alone is what he means by “ideals” then there is 
no reason to generalize about them, and doing so is deceptive.  If on the other hand he 
means ideas that are assigned a higher status and ascribed some essential existence or 
general validity upon which to base principles and judgments, it is difficult to see how the 
kinds of “ideals” apparent in Nietzsche's philosophy are different from this.  Nietzsche 
himself calls the way of thinking and behaving he extols a “Werthungsweise” (“way of 
evaluating”); and at one point, he speaks of “vornehmere Ideale” in place of the 
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“vornehme Werthungsweise” (GM 25).  How this squares with his claim not to favor one 
ideal over another is not clear:  “I erect no new idols” (EC 394).  Some cross-textual 
inconsistency, such as ostensibly rejecting all ideals while occasionally slipping and 
applying that term to his own ideas, could be overlooked if the abhorrence he expresses 
towards what he calls “idealism” were not so fierce and unequivocal—or alternately if it 
were qualified in some way that did not make it appear contradictory.  But careful 
distinctions of meaning are not in the spirit of his invectives against idealism and 
idealists, whom he calls “Schwarzkünstler, welche Weiss, Milch und Unschuld aus jedem 
Schwarz herstellen...Kellerthiere voll Rache und Hass” (VGM 38), (“black magicians, 
who precipitate the white milk of loving-kindness  [produce whiteness, milk and 
innocence] out of every kind of blackness...vermin, full of vindictive hatred”) (GM 181).  
Such extreme language eschews the need for clarity of definition that would be necessary 
to validate his judgments, and thus conceals behind fiery rhetoric the fact that it is is only 
a quarrel over attitudes he is carrying on.  He is not exposing idealism per se for the sham 
that it is; he is only asserting another value system against it, and discrediting it by 
invalidating a category of ideas (idealism) to which his own also belong. 
 To return momentarily to the larger literary comparison being posited, we might  
ask whether the similarity between Nietzsche's denunciations of idealists and 
Frankenstein's vituperations against his creature is entirely coincidental.  According to 
the foregoing analysis of Shelley's novel, Frankenstein's abhorrence of his creature was 
not based on his creature’s villainy alone, which is made highly ambiguous in the novel; 
in part it was also based on the bitter disappointment of his ambitions that the creature 
represented.  Through his hatred of the creature Frankenstein could preserve some 
  
67
remnant reflection of the grandiosity that had driven him even after his ambitions had 
been shattered:  in thematic terms, when the glorified self-image he sought in his great 
project returned instead an image of monstrosity—something opposite of what he sought 
in it.  There is a mysterious likeness in the fact that Nietzsche execrates an idealism that 
is the opposite image of his own, even while the two images have common elements.  In 
a curious way, Nietzsche's “vornehme Whertungsweise” and his “Sklavenmoral” are 
shadow images of each other in a way analogous to that in which Frankenstein's creature 
is a shadow image of him—or, more thematically relevant, the shadow image of his ideal 
self embodied in his failed ambitions.  And just as Frankenstein must reject the hated part 
of himself still reflected back in his creature by demonizing him, so Nietzsche inveighs 
against an ideal reflecting an image (of himself?) which he wishes to reject, in favor of an 
idealized one he embraces.  The “split in the self” evident in both Frankenstein and 
Narcissus is evident in Nietzsche's Herrscher-Sklave dichotomy.  
 The comparison between Nietzsche and the character of Victor Frankenstein aside 
for a moment—a comparison that requires further justification and  to which certain 
objections must be addressed—the idea of a “split in the self” in the philosophical voice 
of Zur Genealogie der Moral between the weakling moralists and the noble “Raubthiere” 
has support in the observations of certain writers on Nietzsche.  First, the comparison 
implies that Nietzsche might have had some reason to identify (and to deplore his 
identification) with those of the “Sklavenmoral,” a possibility that is suggested by what 
Abenheimer relates about Nietzsche's reportedly gentle and kind nature:  “He always said 
that sympathy and pity gave the greatest temptation to him to betray his philosophical 
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principles.”42 This is corroborated by Frazer, according to whom “Nietzsche repeatedly 
complains in his correspondence that 'Schopenhauer's “compassion” has always been the 
major source of problems in my life.'”43  Frazer interprets Nietzsche's critique of 
compassion as “central not only to his almost oedipal struggle with his  'great father,' but 
also to his futile struggle to purge the sympathetic sentiments from his own tormented 
soul” (Frazer 51).  That Nietzsche should have agonized at all about aspects of himself 
that ran counter to his philosophical principles is something of a curiosity, considering 
that he rejected the existence of a self, soul or subject where such a betrayal by one's 
personal attributes could take place:  “...es gibt kein solches Substrat” he says of the 
subject, “es giebt kein 'Sein' hinter dem Thun, Wirken, Werden; der Thäther ist zum Thun 
bloss hinzugedichtet—das Thun ist Alles” (ZGM 35); (“But no such agent exists; there is 
no 'being' behind the doing, acting, becoming; the 'doer' has simply been added to the 
deed [doing] by the imagination—the deed is everything”) (GM 178-79).  Nevertheless, 
this apparent contradiction between these reputed attributes of Nietzsche's and his 
philosophical principles has led Benedetti to posit a “splitting” in Nietzsche's identity: 
 Meine psychologische Deutung der Triebfeder des asketischen 
Immoralisten ist die, dass Nietzsche sich in seiner Ambivalenz gegen 
dasselbe Überich auflehnte, mit welchem er sich in der Bekämpfung der 
depressiven Schwäche identifiziert.  Diesen Widerspruch konnte er nicht 
anders lösen als dadurch, dass er eine Art ‘splitting’ in seinem Überich 
durchführte….44  
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My psychological interpretation of the motivating forces of the ascetic 
immoralist is that Nietzsche, in his ambivalence, rebelled against the same 
superego with which he identified in his struggle with depressive 
weakness.  He couldn’t solve this contradiction in any other way than 
through a kind of ‘splitting’ in his superego.  (My translation) 
 
This “splitting,” according to Benedetti, divided him between a side of him that 
affirmed the vitality with which he identified, and one upon which he projected 
his self-suppression.  The rejection of his latent weaknesses led to self-aggression, 
transformed and directed against others:  the moralists, Christians, the weak; 
against conventional values and traditions (Benedetti 18).  Whatever may be the 
validity of such a psychological analysis, it is striking that the split Benedetti 
identifies in Nietzsche, which has strong support in reports about him, bears such 
close analogy to that identified in the literary comparison with the character of 
Victor Frankenstein.  
 Nevertheless, as has been already mentioned, this comparison requires further 
justification, and certain possible objections must also be addressed.  First, since 
Nietzsche does not place himself into the text of Zur Genealogie der Moral in the same 
way as a character like Frankenstein is placed in the novel, inasmuch as Nietzsche 
himself  identifies with the idealized image reflected in the noble “Raubthier,” this must 
be established in some other way than is obvious in Shelley's story, where Victor 
Frankenstein's identification with his idealized image is clearly thematized.  This 
identification is evident in a passage in which Nietzsche clearly aligns himself with the 
strong and healthy ones, where he declares the necessity of separating the “healthy” from 
the “unhealthy” to avoid contamination:  
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 Und darum gute Luft! gute Luft!  Und weg jedenfalls aus der Nähe von 
allen Irren- und Krankenhäusern der Cultur!  Und darum gute 
Gesellschaft, unsre Gesellschaft! (ZGM 124) 
 
 Then let us have fresh air, and at any rate get away from all lunatic 
asylums and nursing homes45 of culture!  And let us have good company, 
our own company! (GM 261)   
 
The outcry of “good air! good air!” (rendered somewhat less dramatically in the 
translation used here) and apparent dread of asphyxiation by the sick in this passage 
recalls the similar outcry in the “Werkstätte, wo man Ideale fabrizirt” (ZGM 38) 
discussed earlier, further clarifying Nietzsche's identification with the healthy anti-
idealists of the “vornehme Werthungsweise.”46  It also suggests a somewhat paradoxical 
phobia of what he abhors; for if the noble ones are as firm in their identity as  Nietzsche 
has portrayed them, what fear is there of becoming infected by the weak and sickly ones 
of the Ressentiment?  This passage conveys both a direct identification of the 
philosophical voice of Zur Genealogie der Moral with the strong and aggressive figure 
praised throughout the work, and gives a glimpse of the fragility of that identity whose 
wholeness and solidity have been emphatically asserted. 
 Another possible objection to the comparison between the narcissistic split in the 
self discussed with regard to Frankenstein and the vornehme Werthungsweise-
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 Literally “hospitals;” in German, “sickhouses.” 
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 This passage is the only one in Zur Genealogie der Moral in which the 
philosophical voice explicitly identifies with the vornehme Werthungsweise.  However, 
the identification is felt throughout; and it is particularly pronounced in passages such as 
the aforementioned in which  Nietzsche imagines the scornful reply of the “Raubvögel“ 
towards the “lambs,” who censure their morality:  “'wir sind ihnen gar nicht gram, diesen 
guten Lämmern, wir lieben sie sogar:  nichts ist schmackhafter als ein zartes Lamm'” 
(34); (“'We have nothing against these good lambs; in fact, we love them; nothing tastes 
better than a tender lamb'”) (GM 178). The passage is both an echo of the „noble 
Raubthier's” paradoxical assertion of superior disregard of the weak moralist's 
perspective, established through his self-contrast with that perspective, and the insertion 
of the philosophical voice into the predatorial figure. 
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Ressentiment dichotomy in Nietzsche, is that while it might be fair to characterize 
Frankenstein's ambitions as narcissistic, since he is expressly seeking glory and renown, 
it might be asked whether the comparison with Nietzsche is fair when the latter is 
assuming an unpopular position.  While thematically speaking Frankenstein can be said 
to be seizing the spirit of the times and joining himself to its pursuits,47 Nietzsche 
presents himself more as the lone anti-idealistic voice in a culture paralyzed by the 
toxicity of the ascetic ideal, and the ideal personality he puts forward is presented as the 
underdog in the current state of things.  In as far as such an objection might be made, it 
would be necessary to view Nietzsche's philosophy in  its context, when the discarding of 
morality based on ideals might have seemed the way of the future in an age when 
humankind's radical animal nature had been established, but before social Darwinism had 
discredited itself as a model for human society to follow.  The continuance of a social 
morality in which ideals such as compassion, peace and justice would play a central role 
was far from a foregone conclusion in Nietzsche's time, and it is entirely imaginable that 
the first philosophical voice to herald their overthrow as guiding values might have 
considered itself as prophetic as, in the semi-fictitious world of Frankenstein, a scientist 
on the verge of reanimating dead tissue might see himself as heralding a new and 
glorious scientific age destined to conquer mortality.   
 Once again, the most important difference between the vision that splits 
Frankenstein's identity in his fictitious world and that which leads to Nietzsche's division 
of identities in his philosophical one is a difference of orientation:  Frankenstein's is a 
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 “They [the modern scientists] penetrate into the recesses of nature, and show 
how she works in her hiding places,” Frankenstein's teacher M. Waldman tells him in the 
novel, speaking the words that inflame his ambitions (Shelley 53). 
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disappointed vision; Nietzsche's is a hopeful one.  Frankenstein sees, as soon as he has 
succeeded in realizing his scientific dreams, that the aspirations he had invested in them 
were folly; or, speaking in terms of the Narcissus theme, he is horrified by the reality  
that self-idealization has brought about, which is the negative image of what he had 
imagined it to be.  As we have already seen, this does not quite wake him up from 
himself; it is more like a nightmare that haunts sleep without dispelling it.  Nevertheless it 
is disillusionment, which is something Nietzsche's vision of the ascendency of the 
idealized anti-idealist is not.  Nietzsche speaks of this coming age with longing strongly 
redolent of religious fervor, and even imagines this ideal “Mensch der Zukunft”as  a kind 
of Messiah: 
Dieser Mensch der Zukunft, der uns ebenso vom bisherigen Ideal erlösen 
wird...vom grossen Ekel, vom Willen zum Nichts, vom Nihilismus...der 
den Willen wieder frei macht, der der Erde ihr Ziel und dem Menschen 
seine Hoffnung zurückgiebt, dieser Antichrist und Antinihilist, dieser 
Besieger Gottes und des Nichts—er muss einst kommen. (ZGM 90) 
 
This man of the future, who will deliver us...from a lapsed  ideal [i.e. the 
“ascetic ideal”]...from violent loathing [disgust], the will to extinction 
[nothing], nihilism...who will make the will free once more and restore to 
the earth its aim, and to man his hope; this anti-Christ and anti-nihilist, 
conqueror of both God and Unbeing—one day he must come.... (GM 230) 
 
The religious resonances of this passage are sufficiently obvious that they don't require 
much pointing out; however one particularly relevant example of Nietzsche's borrowing 
back the colors of a discarded canvas, for use in painting the world he imagines, lies in 
his sense of “restoring to the earth its aim.”  Since the banishment of God is central to the 
ideal future Nietzsche portrays, it no longer makes sense within this framework to speak 
of an overarching “aim” for the world that is not imposed on it—and any “aim” imposed 
would be in conflict with another's aim for it, and thus not overarching—so that 
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“restoring to the earth its aim” sounds entirely at odds with the tenets of Nietzsche's own 
philosophy;48 yet such an aim is also essential to his vision. 
 Benedetti has noted a curious lack of content in Nietzsche's reformist vision.  He 
quotes Hirschberger's observation that whenever Nietzsche speaks about this brighter 
future, “[es] zeigt sich das alte Bild:  die Aufgabe wird gestellt, die Forderung in immer 
neuen Worten erhoben, wie schön und gross das alles wäre, aber dabei bleibt es auch:  
der Inhalt fehlt;” („the same picture emerges:  the challenge is laid, the demand raised in 
ever new wording, how beautiful and great everything would be, but it stops at that:  the 
content is missing.“)49  The observation of a lack of content is highly interesting 
considering the characteristics of idealization discussed throughout this paper.  It is 
perhaps even more interesting for the fact that where Nietzsche does specify particulars 
about his ideal world, it is primarily in negative terms; we know relatively little about it 
except what it is not.  Presumably it is a world dominated by those of the “vornehme 
Werthungsweise,” and its ethic higher and more heroic, it seems,  than contemporary pre-
occupations with “die Heraufkunft der Demokratie, der Friedens-Schiedsgerichte an 
Stelle der Kriege, der Frauen-Gleichberechtigung, der Religion des Mitleids und was es 
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sonst Alles für Symptome des absinkenden Lebens giebt” (VGM 156); (“the advent of 
democracy, of arbitration courts in place of wars, of equal rights for women, or a religion 
of pity [or compassion]—to mention but a few of the symptoms of declining vitality”) 
(GM 290-91).  What these higher purposes might be, against which causes of peace, 
justice and compassion pale, are left to the imagination.  Those lower purposes are in 
Nietzsche's view the priorities of the bourgeois herd, and have their origins in the 
morality that Nietzsche has been attacking throughout Zur Genealogie der Moral; they 
are part of the real world Nietzsche knew.  This passage is another instance in which  
idealization seems to substitute for content, and the idealized world presents a kind of 
negative image of the real one and apparently has no content of its own.  The world of the 
noble “Raubthier” is the opposite of what Nietzsche claimed about his hero:  it acquires 
its identity by contrast. 
   To return to the aforementioned passage in which Nietzsche longs for a brighter 
future, in what follows immediately upon this passage Nietzsche makes it clear that he 
sees himself in the “prophetic” and not the “messianic” role of the “Mensch der Zukunft” 
who will bring it about: 
An dieser Stelle geziemt mir nur Eins, zu schweigen:  ich vergriffe mich 
sonst an dem, was einem Jüngeren allein freisteht, einem “Zukünftigeren”, 
einem Stärkeren, als ich bin...  (ZGM 91) 
 
I've reached the term of my speech [at this point, only one thing is fitting, 
to be silent]; to continue here would be to usurp the right of one younger, 
stronger, more pregnant with future than I am... (GM 230) 
 
The identification of the philosophical perspective with the interests of the „Mensch der 
Zukunft” is strongly felt here, even while the identification with that figure is disavowed.  
The passage is not without a sense of pathos.  It is as close as Nietzsche ever comes to 
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expressing the sort of defeat of his ideals that, for example, Frankenstein expresses; and it 
is not without the sense of tragedy in Narcissus' never having his beloved..  The 
comparisons are not entirely arbitrary.  It is true that Nietzsche's vision of the future is not 
at all diminished by the admission that realizing it must be left to someone younger and 
stronger.  But if it no longer makes sense to speak of an overarching purpose for the 
world under the terms the philosopher has established, then what use is it to the voice 
speaking that such a future should ever be realized?  What kinship does he bear to those 
who stand to benefit by it?  The meaningfulness in the analogy with the prophetic role the 
philosopher is serving dissolves when that role can no longer be said to speak for some 
larger universal  purpose—and such purpose has supposedly never been pretended:  it has 
always been for the noble “Raubthier” that the philosopher speaks, and against everyone 
who is against “him.”  Yet the philosopher seems to imagine this aim exists, and has 
some more encompassing significance than the benefit of those whom it would benefit—
a group that itself has no clear identity, but is certainly not everybody.  For purposes of 
the thesis being argued, the self-admission that the philosophical voice is acting out the 
role of “prophet” who foresees, and not of “messiah” who fulfills, does not argue against 
the assertion that the “Mensch der Zunkunft”—the “vornehme Werthungsweise,” the 
noble “Raubthier”—is an idealized reflection of Nietzsche himself; for it has been argued 
all along that the idealized reflection of the self need bear no resemblance to the “real 
self”—to the reality of who one really is, or in this case even who one has the potential to 
be.  In this passage particularly, the two appear tragically distinct. 
 With the sort of fervency attached to the hoped-for ascendency of the “vornehme 
Werthungsweise” and the personality characterized by it, as well as the negative view 
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expressed towards compassion generally, it is not surprising that lack of feeling and 
hostility are  expressed towards those who are not characterized by this superior mindset.  
This hostility is clear in several passages already cited that express disgust for the weak 
and portray the heroic “Raubvögel” praying upon them in good conscience.  We have 
also encountered Nietzsche's oddly phobic anxiety lest those of the superior mindset 
should become infected by the weak and confuse themselves with them.  This anxiety is 
sufficiently intense that Nietzsche calls for a complete separation of the “high” and  
“healthy” from the “sick” and “lowly” (the same dichotomy of “vornehme” and 
“ohnmächtige” referred to earlier): 
Dass die Kranken nicht die Gesunden krank machen...das sollte doch der 
oberste Gesichtspunkt auf Erden sein:—dazu aber gehört vor allen 
Dingen, dass die Gesunden von den Kranken abgetrennt bleiben, behütet 
selbst vor dem Anblick der Kranken, dass sie sich nicht mit den Kranken 
verwechseln.  (ZGM 124) 
 
Our first rule on this earth should be that the sick must not contaminate the 
healthy.  But this requires that the healthy be isolated from the sick, be 
spared even the sight of the sick, lest they mistake that foreign sickness for 
their own [confuse themselves with the sick]. (GM 261) 
 
This passage has deep resonance with regard to the theme being explored; for the idea 
that the “healthy” are in danger of confusing themselves with the “sick” is a sort of 
opposite image of Narcissus, who also misinterprets the image he sees, but fails to see it 
as himself.  It bears more direct and perhaps more profound analogy with Frankenstein, 
who beheld the image in which he had invested his sublime ambitions and saw something 
horrific instead.   One of the remarkable aspects of that moment in Shelley's novel was 
the fragility of Frankenstein's ambitions (and  the self-idealization they represented):  
“dreams that had been my food and pleasant rest for so long a space were become a hell 
to me; and the change was so rapid, the overthrow so complete!” (Shelley 61).  The same 
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sort of fragility is observable here.  Once again setting aside the whole question of a 
social ethic calling for such a quarantine—as well as a hierarchy of nobility forbidding 
the degradation of the higher by putting them at the service of the lower (“das Höhere soll 
sich nicht zum Werkzeug des Niedrigeren herabwürdigen” [124])—and the quality of this 
imagined society, what is of interest in the present inquiry is the sense of instability about 
it:  an instability expressed in the need to erase those excluded and rendered worthless by 
the values of the “vornehme Werthungsweise.”  At the end of the same passage, 
Nietzsche asserts the need of the healthy ones to “defend ourselves” 
(“uns...vertheidigen”) against the two worst scourges threatening them:  “gegen den 
grossen Ekel am Menschen! Gegen das grosse Mitleid mit dem Menschen!...” (ZGM 
124); (“against...unrelieved loathing of man and unrelieved pity of him!”) (GM 261).  
Behind this seems to lurk the conflict referred to earlier by Abenheimer, who claimed 
that Nietzsche regarded sympathy and pity as temptations to betray his philosophical 
principles (Abenheimer 77).  Again this suggests comparison with Victor Frankenstein, 
in his flight from his creation.  Earlier in this analysis that abandonment was interpreted 
as the shunning of the “real” other Frankenstein had brought to life—and whose 
existence he owed and denied acknowledgment—in order to maintain some semblance of 
the idealized self, the pursuit of which drove Frankenstein to create him.  There is almost 
a precise analogy here,  for unlike the noble, healthy ones whose depiction throughout 
Nietzsche's work has had something of a mythical quality about it,50 those being called 
“sick” and “lowly” here—who inspire loathing—undoubtedly have their referents in the 
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 A particularly vivid synopsis of this personality that conveys well its semi-
mythical quality describes it in terms of its “rohen, stürmischen, zügellosen, harten, 
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real world.  Frankenstein's lack of feeling for the “real other” of that story, which inspires 
his creature to reproach him with heartlessness and curse him (Shelley 121), is also 
apparent in Nietzsche, with the difference that Nietzsche  betrays an inclination to 
acknowledge and feel for the “real other”—an inclination Frankenstein rarely and only 
briefly expresses.  But this inclination Nietzsche seems to feel the need to combat—when 
not through a portrayal of the weak and lowly of the world as the sick-minded and hate-
filled adversaries of his noble “Raubthier,” then by advocating a cultural quarantine 
against them.  In passages already examined, Nietzsche carries out a kind of vicarious 
campaign of violence against them through his noble “Raubthier,” and with the 
overthrow of the slave ethic he imagines a kind of ghettoization of the inferior ones; for 
their very existence is an affront to the human ideal he puts forward—this must be spared 
the very sight of them.  Like Frankenstein’s creature, and for that matter Echo in Ovid’s 
story also, the “real other” in Nietzsche’s work—“die Ohnmächtigen,” the weakling and 
poisonous moralist—haunts the work, and seemingly the conscience of the writer: 
Sie haben die Tugend jetzt ganz und gar für sich in Pacht genommen, 
diese Schwachen und Hiellos-Krankhaften, daran ist kein Zweifel:...Sie 
wandeln unter uns herum als leibhafte Vorwürfe, als Warnungen an us,—
wie als ob Gesundheit, Wohlgerathenheit, Stärke, Stolz, Machtgefühl an 
sich schon lasterhafte Dinge seien, für die man einst büssen, bitter büssen 
müsse...(VGM 122) 
 
They have by now entirely monopolized virtue [these weak and incurably 
sick ones, there is no doubt of it];...They walk among us as warnings and 
reprimands incarnate, as though to say that health, soundness, strength, 
and pride [and sense of power] are vicious things for which we shall one 
day pay dearly...(GM 259) 
 
An unacknowledged sense of bad conscience in the philosophical voice of Zur 
Genealogie der Moral is a powerful current that is felt throughout the work.  It is true that 
Nietzsche has a considerable amount to say about the bad conscience, and not all of it is 
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purely negative (or at least not completely inauspicious).    He explains the bad 
conscience as the inevitable suffering resulting when mankind was wrenched from a state 
of nature and placed within the strictures of civilization: 
Ich nehme das schlechte Gewissen als die tiefe Erkrankung, welcher der 
Mensch unter dem Druck jener gründlichsten aller Veränderungen 
verfallen musste, die er überhaupt erlebt hat,—jener Veränderung, als er 
sich endgültig in den Bann der Gesellschaft und des Friedens 
eingeschlossen fand. (ZGM 76) 
 
I take bad conscience to be a deep-seated malady to which man 
succumbed under the pressure of the most profound transformation he 
ever underwent—the one that made him once and for all a sociable and 
pacific creature [when he found himself shut in within the confines of 
society and peace]. (GM 216). 
 
According to his argument, when aggression and cruelty were no longer deemed 
acceptable within the confines of society, mankind turned it inward (an argument that 
Freud seems to have adopted from Nietzsche, or perhaps from the intellectual consensus 
the idea had won).  This became the bad conscience.  A few sections later, Nietzsche 
compares the bad conscience to a pregnancy:  “Es ist eine Krankheit, das schlechte 
Gewissen, das unterliegt keinem Zweifel, aber eine Krankheit, wie die Schwangerschaft 
eine Krankheit ist” (ZGM 81).  (“There can be no doubt that bad conscience is a sickness, 
but so, in a sense, is pregnancy [but a sickness such as pregnancy is a sickness]”) (GM 
221).  He does not expound on the comparison, but from what follows he seems to mean 
that the bad conscience was a necessary evil that mankind had to endure in the 
progression towards some greater fulfillment:  the age of “second innocence.”  In spite of 
its status of unfortunate necessity in Nietzsche's philosophical framework, the extent to 
which a bad conscience may have infected the philosopher's own tone and colored his 
judgments is never hinted at in a way that suggests awareness.  But a bad conscience 
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seems to animate the hostility expressed towards moralist weaklings of the Ressentiment; 
of these it creates caricatures of moralizing spite and hatred.  And it is worth remarking 
that Nietzsche's own tone in speaking of the inferior ones is much more similar to the 
way he describes them, than it is to the manner befitting  his superior personality, who is 
characterized more by a high disregard for the meanness of his inferiors:   
Das ist das Zeichen starker voller Naturen, in denen ein Überschuss 
plastischer, nachbildender, ausheilender, auch vergessen machender Kraft 
ist (ein gutes Beispiel dafür aus der modernen Welt ist Mirabeau, welcher 
kein Gedächtniss für Insulte und Niederträchtigkeiten hatte, die man an 
ihm begieng, und der nur deshalb nicht vergeben konnte, weil er—
vergass).  (ZGM 29) 
 
It is a sign of strong, rich temperaments that they cannot for long take 
seriously their enemies, their misfortunes, their misdeeds; for such 
characters have in them an excess of plastic curative power, and also the 
power of oblivion.  (A good modern example of the latter is Mirabeau, 
who lacked all memory of insults and meanesses done him, and who was 
unable to forgive because he had forgotten. (GM 173). 
 
 The voice of Zur Genealogie der Moral seems to have more of the “Mensch des 
Ressentiment” than is openly acknowledged.  As Frankenstein’s creature continues to 
have a claim upon him in spite of Frankenstein's attempts to disown him, so the 
“Sklavenmoral” continues to have a voice in Nietzsche’s philosophy that is highly 
comparable:  the tone of Nietzsche's invectives against the “Sklavenmoral” are not unlike 
Frankenstein's vilifications of his creature and his futile crusade against him.  This might 
explain the concept of “second innocence,” which, as has already been pointed out, also 
harks back to the idea of “original innocence” (preceding “original sin”) of Judaeo-
Christian tradition: for Nietzsche, the tradition most responsible for producing the 
Ressentiment.  Characterizing a return to guilt-free cruelty as a “second innocence” could 
be viewed as an attempt to cleanse his own idealism, and the idealized figures who 
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inhabit it, of moral ugliness—much as the image that enraptured Narcissus removed that 
which was ugly and unlovable about him.  The analogy could be carried further still; for 
as Narcissus’ image was “a shadow without substance,” so it is worth asking what is left 
of Nietzsche's noble “Raubthier,” when that which is ugly from the perspective of a 
developed social conscience—something Nietzsche appears to have shared in spite of 
himself—and the idealization with which he infused it, are taken away. 
 From the perspective being put forward here, Zur Genealogie der Moral seems 
less like the whole-hearted casting off of morality that it professes to be and more like an 
expression of profound self-conflict:  of a “self” deeply divided between a projection of 
an idealized image that one imagines, and one that haunts the self-idealizer with its 
realities.  It is the same split that we have seen before:  a gap that widens as the idealized 
self takes on sublime proportions.  Why this self-idealization seems such an integral 
element of narcissism is somewhat mysterious:  why a sober, more or less accurate view 
of who one is should not be sufficiently inspiring of self-adoration is a question worthy of 
reflection.  The answer that suggests itself is that sober self-regard is only the healthy 
counterpart to the narcissistic self-flight being focused upon here.  But the self-
idealization that is the object of narcissistic adoration may be a substitute for something 
else—something larger than the self alone—for which this cannot substitute without 
diminishing even the self that it is.  In making of itself something sublime, the self loses 
the substance that it has.  In Frankenstein, as we have seen, self-idealization becomes its 
opposite.  Frankenstein's creature is both the shadow image of the idealized self created 
by his ambitions, and the “other” for which the ideal self-image is substituted.  Feeling 
for the “other” might have humanized Frankenstein; but his rejection of this other in 
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favor of a continuance of his ideal “self” in some form renders his creature an object of 
sublime loathing, which the “other” that is rejected in preference for narcissistic 
symmetry seems doomed to become.  In Nietzsche, this dynamic is made more complex 
by the circumstance that the idealized self is in some ways its own shadow side; on some 
level.  It is the weak, “die Ohnmächtigen,” “der Mensch des Ressentiment,” against 
which Nietzsche directs his ire; but in some ways his own ideal seems to be an object of 
repugnance as well, which he must vindicate by waging war on idealism that condemns 
even while it constitutes it; and by summoning a “second innocence” whose redeeming 
light is also borrowed from this rejected idealism.  His hyperbolic style notwithstanding, 
it is without any apparent irony that Nietzsche evinces a fierce faith in the ideal of the 
noble “Raubthier” throughout Zur Genealogie der Moral, and he never contradicts it 
elsewhere in his philosophy.  But under the surface, in passages such as the last one 
quoted at length (ZGM 122 & GM 259) and that in which he silences himself (ZGM 91 & 













In the introduction to this study it was suggested that Nietzsche's reversal of 
orientation towards the Narcissus theme might have signaled a liberation of self-creative 
power from the superstitious strictures of the past, particularly the artificially constructed 
self that was made of the same theological stuff as God.  Nietzsche proclaimed the death 
of both self and God, and thus seemed to be heralding the final end of a chapter in the 
history of Western culture whose conclusion had already begun centuries before when 
God began to be displaced from the center of human focus.  The self-abnegating shame in 
the face of God was false in its origins and hypocritical in its purpose; for in reality it was 
only frustrated aggression and natural cruelty turned inward, but was used for the self-
aggrandizement of the weak who attempted to bolster their status and power and leach 
their own significance from the association with God.  With the unleashing of long-
suppressed aggression and cruelty the noble ones of Nietzsche's philosophy cast off this 
hypocrisy, and their self-celebration was an honest expression of a self-concept that had 
no more need of a God whose reign was over—and who thus could no longer protect His 
subjects from these new invaders whose time of conquest had come.  It might have been 
noticed from the outset of the discussion of Zur Genealogie der Moral that there was a 
certain contradiction in this self-celebration; for if there was no “'being' behind the doing, 
acting, becoming”—if “the deed  is everything” (GM 178-79), then what self-concept 
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were the noble Raubthiere expressing?  What “self” was there to celebrate?  In any case, 
Nietzsche seemed to be heralding at least the spirit of this new age, if not actually 
bringing about the changes it promised.  On examination this does not seem so much the 
case.  Under an ardent and jubilant surface there is a sense of self-revulsion at the image 
he has created—an image which reflected, if not  Nietzsche (for he appears always—
perhaps for the better—to have fallen short of his own ideal) then his idealized self- 
identification.  Even if this were not true—even if Nietzsche were less like Frankenstein, 
who was horrified at what his self-idealization had brought to life, and more like 
Narcissus who was nothing but enchanted with his ideal image to the end—there would 
still be a certain despair, perhaps not entirely unconscious to the philosophical voice of 
the work, in having so fervently, even religiously believed in and promoted a vision of 
the world that cannot be said in any absolute way to be an improvement of it without the 
infection of the valuations that this vision purports to overthrow—and these valuations 
must ultimately judge Nietzsche's vision abhorrent.51  In as far as the philosophical voice 
of Zur Genealogie der Moral can be equated with Nietzsche's own, it is worth noting that 
in spite of the enormous influence Nietzsche has exerted on philosophy, literature and 
culture, in the contempt the philosopher expresses for peace, justice and compassion his 
vision for the future departed quite radically from the ideals towards which, up to the 
                                                 
51
 At this point it might be useful to recall the possibility mentioned earlier in the 
discussion of Nietzsche's voice (footnote 24)  that Nietzsche is presenting an alternative 
to the predominant morality of his age in order to show it to be only one morality among 
many possibilities.  Even if this is the case and Nietzsche's main point was not the ethic 
he was promoting but the arbitrariness of the present one in the face of other possibilities, 
the success of such a demonstration would depend on the ability of that vision to stand on 




present at least, humankind has continued, in spite of sometimes magnificent failures, to 
strive. 
 With respect to the nineteenth century in particular and the questions posed about 
this in the introduction, in spite of the final departure Nietzsche seems to make from God 
the quality of free-floating holiness left by the decentralization of the sacred is still 
strongly felt in Nietzsche's philosophy—it is, strangely enough, a sort of glue holding it 
together, in spite of the fact that it has no real place there.  And through Nietzsche's 
concept of “second innocence” it imbues the noble “Raubthier” as well, borrowing from 
the Judaeo-Christian myth of a once blessed state in which human beings in their 
innocence shared directly in the blessedness of their Creator.  In the theology presented in 
Zur Genealogie der Moral morality is the new fallenness, and the ability to murder, rape, 
and torture in good conscience (ZGM 30 & GM 174) the new innocence—fascinating, 
considering it is the idealists who are called, “Schwarzkünstler, welche Weiss, Milch und 
Unschuld aus jedem Schwarz herstellen” (VGM 38), (“black magicians, who [produce 
whiteness, milk and innocence] out of every kind of blackness”) (GM 181).  But when 
Nietzsche declares that it is not himself who shall bring about the great change in 
morality he foresees, this is not only true in deed, as he seems to mean it, but also in 
spirit.  Zur Genealogie der Moral expresses the kind of freedom from conscience 
proclaimed in it only on the surface; this ideal seems to remain as vehemently desired and 
as unattainable to the philosophical voice of the work as Narcissus' image was from him.  
To whatever extent the work has ever inspired (or may yet inspire) the kind of exultant 
cruelty disabused of conscience that it idealizes, it gives no reason to expect such an ideal 
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should ever be realized for its perpetrators, since such an ideal appears illusory even in its 
own manifesto. 
 Like Frankenstein and Ovid's story of Narcissus, Zur Genealogie der Moral 
portrays a deeply divided self:  an identity so close and yet infinitely separated from an 
ideal with which it identifies.  In each depiction that ideal not only takes the place of the 
“real self” in one's self-conception but also substitutes for a real relationship with the 
world outside this spectral symmetry.  What the nineteenth-century portrayals of this self-
idealization seem to show is that  this inward relationship is haunted by self-abhorrence, 
which is thus expressed in abhorrence of  the opposite of this idealized self—the real 
other.  The irony in both works seems to be that the real self has more basis of identity 
with the real other than with the projected self:  Frankenstein is more like the living being 
with emotional needs (and elevated style of speech) than his ideal; and Nietzsche also 
seems to have more in common with the “Mensch des Ressentiment”—perhaps even with 
the “incurably sick”—than with the noble “Raubthier.”  On an obvious level, this must 
necessarily be true; for as has already been seen, the idealized self is by nature spectral 
and without substance; it cannot contain the basis for a real identification.  On another 
level, perhaps there is also the hint that the transcendent which one seems to seek in the 
projected self is in reality somehow bound up in the relationship with the other, which 
self-idealization represents an aborted effort to attain.  This is hinted at thematically in 
Frankenstein, by the real other of that story, who tries to appeal to what should have been 
natural feeling in Frankenstein from the start:  “'Remember, that I am thy creature; I 
ought to be thy Adam; but I am rather the fallen angel, whom thou drivest from joy for no 
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misdeed'” (Shelley 94).  Neither work shows what this transcendence of the self might 
have been, they only show the narcissistic failure. 
 This passage brings us around to a theme touched upon at the outset and which 
has been an overarching theme throughout this study:  the usurpation of the role of God 
in the nineteenth century.  God was the great “Other” who imparted meaning in the 
theological past.  Frankenstein's self-idealization places him thematically in that role in 
Shelley's novel—a role in which he is doomed to fail.  Nietzsche too assumes that role, 
which by now history and cultural change seem to demand; the shadows of superstition 
seem to have been swept away to make room for it, and now it seems time to sweep away 
the enervating and pernicious values that had been cultivated in those shadows.  Self-
elevation to that role is only fitting, and there is no higher Authority to forbid it (it would 
be pusillanimous to submit to it if there were:  such a consideration is beneath the noble 
“Raubthier”).  Philosophically Nietzsche creates his vision of the world, creates beings to 
inhabit it and a “Werthungsweise” to replace the moral system.  But the vision only really 
coheres by virtue of elements borrowed from the rejected vision:  in reality, it is only a 
version of this, idealized according to the philosopher's values.  Without this it dissolves, 
and the philosopher's prophetic role with it.  But even if this were not true—even if 
Nietzsche were to have constructed his ideal future without imbuing it with any sense of 
borrowed holiness—one might still regard the result of his work  and wonder whether 
self-idealized creation had the potential to realize anything but monstrous visions that 
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